On modular and fully-abstract compilation - Technical appendix by Patrignani, Marco et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
05
04
4v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  1
8 A
pr
 20
16
On Modular and Fully-Abstract Compilation –
Technical Appendix
Marco Patrignani1 Dominique Devriese2
Frank Piessens2
1 Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Germany
2 iMinds-Distrinet, Dept. Computer Science, KU Leuven, Belgium
{ first.last }@{ mpi-sws.org | cs.kuleuven.be }
April 19, 2016
Abstract
Secure compilation studies compilers that generate target-level compo-
nents that are as secure as their source-level counterparts. Full abstraction
is the most widely-proven property when defining a secure compiler.
A compiler is modular if it allows different components to be compiled
independently and then to be linked together to form a whole program.
Unfortunately, many existing fully-abstract compilers to untyped ma-
chine code are not modular. So, while fully-abstractly compiled compo-
nents are secure from malicious attackers, if they are linked against each
other the resulting component may become vulnerable to attacks.
This paper studies how to devise modular, fully-abstract compilers.
It first analyses the attacks arising when compiled programs are linked
together, identifying security threats that are due to linking. Then, it
defines a compiler from an object-based language with method calls and
dynamic memory allocation to untyped assembly language extended with
a memory isolation mechanism. The paper provides a proof sketch that
the defined compiler is fully-abstract and modular, so its output can be
linked together without introducing security violations.
This paper uses colours to distinguish elements of different languages; please print
this in colour.
1 Introduction
A compiler is a tool that, among other things, translates programs written in
a source language into programs written in a target language. A compiler is
secure when it preserves all security properties of the components (i.e., partial
programs) it inputs in the components it outputs. Secure compilation stud-
ies compilers that generate target-level components that are as secure as their
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source-level counterparts. Full abstraction is the most widely-adopted property
to prove when defining a secure compiler [1, 4, 24, 35, 6, 7, 20, 2, 14, 18, 13].
A fully-abstract compiler preserves and reflects observational equivalence be-
tween the source components it inputs and the target components it produces.
Observational equivalence captures security properties such confidentiality, in-
tegrity, etc, and since a fully-abstract compiler preserves all of them, it is a
secure compiler.
A compiler is modular when it operates on components and its output can
be linked together into larger components (and possibly into whole programs).
With the advent of machine-code level security architectures (e.g., protected
modules architectures (PMA) [39, 31, 30], capability machines [43, 42], micro-
policies enforcing architectures [9], address space layout randomisation [4], etc.)
researchers have investigated secure (fully-abstract) compilation to such archi-
tectures [35, 26, 4, 24].
For secure compilation to PMA (informally, a low-level memory isolation
mechanism), only compilation of a single protected module has been consid-
ered. Generalizing this to multiple modules, supporting modular compilation
and linking of protected modules at machine code level, would be useful for a
number of reasons: (i) code is easier to develop and distribute in standalone
components and (ii) merging modules in a single one is not always possible nor
desirable. Concerning (i), standard arguments for separate compilation apply.
Particularly, it is more efficient to compile only the modules that changed and
link it against the previously compiled other code as opposed to recompiling the
entire code base. Moreover, it is common in practice and useful to use libraries
that are built from safe source code but only available in compiled form. When
targeting PMA with attestation capabilities, a benefit of having each module
in a different protected module is that this makes it possible to attest them
independently. Concerning (ii), there can be several reasons why merging more
modules in a single one is not desirable; even with a secure compiler, it can still
be useful to protect securely compiled components from each other. Consider
a source language that allows programmers to write both safe and unsafe code
at the same time (e.g., Rust, C# unsafe blocks or the language considered by
Juglaret et al. [27]). A desirable property for a compiler for such a language is
that unsafe code does not affect the safe one. In this case, one can foresee split-
ting the safe and the unsafe program parts in two different modules and using the
secure compiler presented in this paper for the safe part. In this way, both the
safe and the unsafe code cannot be directly tampered with by an attacker and
the unsafe code can not affect the safe one. Another setting where merging mul-
tiple modules is undesirable is when a programmer provides a hand-optimised
securely-compiled component that performs better than the ones obtained by a
secure compiler, but with the same security guarantees. In this case, merging
such a component with other ones in a single module seems undesirable, as the
hand-made assembly can be error-prone and maliciously-crafted. However, by
using a modular secure compiler, other components can still interact with the
hand-optimised one and no one’s security can be tampered.
Extending the compiler to support modular compilation is, however, sur-
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prisingly complicated for a number of reasons:
1. with a single protected module, all run-time meta information about the
execution that needs to be protected (e.g., the call stack, or dynamic type
information) can be stored within that single protected module. For a
modular compiler, that state must be divided over the various protected
modules, or – possibly – stored in a centralized trusted protected module.
2. with a single protected module, object references are either private to the
module or public. With support for multiple protected modules, object
references can also be shared between some modules and still be unknown
to other ones. This requires a mechanism for protecting object references
that is more elaborate than what the existing secure compiler to PMA
uses.
There are several interesting approaches to address these challenges. This
paper investigates how these issues can be addressed constructing a modular
fully-abstract compiler for PMA in the style of Intel SGX [30] without addi-
tional hardware support. Even if this turns out to be intricate, we believe there
is value in this approach, as this kind of hardware support is available on com-
mercially available systems today, whereas more advanced hardware support is
only available in research prototypes.
An alternative approach to modular, secure compilation would be to inves-
tigate what kind of novel hardware security architectures can help in addressing
these challenges. This is the approach taken by Juglaret et al. [26] and it can
likely lead to a secure compilation scheme. An important downside is that it
may take a while before such hardware extensions are available in mainstream
systems.
The main contribution of this paper is J · KJEMAIL , a modular and fully-abstract
compiler to SGX-like PMA. The source language of J · KJEMAIL is JEM, an object-
based imperative language with method calls and dynamic memory allocation.
The target language of J · KJEMAIL is AIL, untyped assembly language with an ex-
plicit linking mechanism extended with PMA. JEM, AIL and PMA are formalised
in Section 2. Explicitly considering linking between assembly components gen-
erates a number of previously-unobserved problems that are presented in Sec-
tion 3. The main contribution of this paper is the formalisation of J · KJEMAIL ,
presented in Section 4. Supporting additional language features is discussed
in Section 5. The proof sketch of J · KJEMAIL being fully-abstract and modular is
presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 discusses related work and Section 8
concludes.
2 Languages Formalisation
This section describes JEM (Section 2.1) and AIL (Section 2.2), respectively the
source and the target language of the secure compiler J · KJEMAIL .
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2.1 The Source Language JEM
JEM is a strongly-typed, single-threaded, object-based imperative language that
has private fields and public methods; it does not allow any undefined be-
haviour to arise. JEM is presented in a green font (Figure 1).
component C ::= C
classes C ::= import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
objects O ::= object o : t{F}
class
declarations
I ::= class-decl c{m :Mt}
object
declarations
X ::= obj-decl o : t;
methods M ::= public m(x) : Mt {return E; }
signatures Mt ::= t(t)→ t
fields F ::= private f = v
field types Ft ::= f : t
constructors K ::= c(f : t) {this.f ′ = f}
types t ::= Unit | Bool | Int | c | Obj
values v ::= unit | true | false | n | o
operations op ::= + | − | == | · · ·
expressions E ::= v | x | E.f | E.f = E | E.m(E)
| E op E | new t(E) | E;E | this
| if (E) {E} else {E} | exit E
| instanceof(E : c) | var x : t = E
Figure 1: Syntax of JEM; lists of elements a1 · · · an are denoted as a.
A class C declares (external) classes and objects it requires (these are called
import requirements) then it defines its constructor, fields, methods and objects
implementing that class. Objects of a class can only be allocated by methods of
that class (so cross-componentmemory allocation happens via factory methods).
Class declarations I define class signatures, i.e., the class name and the methods
implemented by that class. Object declarations X are references to objects
implementing a different class. A JEM component C is a collection of classes C.
If all import requirements of C are satisfied by some other class in C, then C
is a whole program. Two components C1 and C2 satisfy each other, denoted
with C1⌢C2, if all import requirements of C1 are classes and objects in C2 and
vice-versa.
The top of the JEM class hierarchy is Obj, a class defining no methods. All
4
classes implicitly extend Obj; JEM does not provide any other form of inheritance.
Primitive types are Unit, inhabited by unit, Bool, inhabited by true and false
and Int, inhabited by natural numbers n. Identifiers for classes c, objects o,
methods m, fields f and variables x are taken from distinct denumerable sets.
The semantics of JEM is standard and unsurprising; it is omitted for space
reasons.
The security mechanism of JEM is given by private fields, which can be used
to define security properties such as confidentiality and integrity (as defined in
Section 3.1).
2.1.1 Contextual Equivalence for JEM
To reason about the behaviour of JEM components, contextual equivalence is
used [37]. Contextual equivalence is the coarsest relation that tells when two
components are behaviourally equivalent; its definition (Definition 1) is rather
standard [6, 7, 35, 20, 4, 24, 13, 21, 32].
Contexts C are partial programs with a hole ([·]), formally C ::= C[·]. The
plugging of a component C in a context C, denoted as C[C], returns a whole
programC; C. There are two (common) assumptions for the plugging to succeed.
The first one is that C⌢C, the second one is that C and C are well-typed. If
any assumption is not upheld, the plugging returns the empty program.
Definition 1 (Contextual equivalence for JEM). C1≃ctx C2 , ∀C,C[C1]⇑ ⇐⇒
C[C2]⇑, where ⇑ means divergence, i.e., the execution of an unbounded number
of reduction steps.
2.2 PMA and the Target Language AIL
AIL (acronym of Assembly plus Isolation and Linking) is a low-level language that
models a von Neumann machine enhanced with PMA (Section 2.2.1), with an
idealised form of cryptographic nonces (Section 2.2.2) and with an explicit link-
ing mechanism (Section 2.2.3). AIL is the adaptation of an analogous language
that had no linking mechanism, no idealised cryptographic nonces and a single
PMA module [35, 36]. After presenting PMA and AIL, this section describes the
semantics (Section 2.2.4) and contextual equivalence for AIL (Section 2.2.5).
2.2.1 PMA
PMA is an assembly-level isolation mechanism based on program counter-based
memory access control. PMA can be implemented in software (e.g., via a hyper-
visor) [29, 38, 39] or in hardware [8, 30, 31]; Intel is bringing it to mainstream
processors with the Intel SGX instruction set [30]. PMA logically divides the
memory space into several protected and one unprotected section; a protected
section is called protected module, each module has a unique module id. All
protected sections are further divided into a code and a data section. Code
sections contain a variable number of entry points : the only protected addresses
to which instructions in unprotected memory or in other protected sections can
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jump. Entry points allow code from within the module to interoperate with
external code. Data sections are only accessible from within the protected code
section of the same module. The table below summarises the PMA access con-
trol model.
From \ To Unprotected
Protected
Entry Point Code Data
Unprotected r w x x
Protected r w x
Same id
r x r x r w
Different id
x
2.2.2 Core AIL
AIL is presented in a pink font (Figure 2).
numbers n ::= n ∈ N
words w ::= n | σ | π
addresses a ::= (id, n)
memories m ::= a 7→ w
flags f ::= ZF 7→ 0 | 1; SF 7→ 0 | 1
register files r ::= r 7→ w
module ids id ∈ ID ⊂ N
symbolic nonces π ∈ Π
module descriptors s ::= (id, nc, n)
nonce oracles h ::= π
symbols σ, ι ∈ S
instructions i ∈ I ⊂ N
Figure 2: Formalisation of AIL (part 1: language).
Words w are either natural numbers n (including instruction encodings and
module ids), symbols σ (explained in Section 2.2.3) or symbolic nonces π. Ad-
dresses a are pairs of natural numbers and module ids, so a module with id id
has an infinite memory starting from address (id, 0). Unprotected memory has
id 0. The registers file r contains an unbounded number of registers r. The flags
register f contains a sign (SF) and a zero flag (ZF) that are set by arithmetic
and testing instructions. Memories m are lists of bindings from addresses to
words. Module descriptors s are triples that define a module memory layout:
id indicates the id of the module, nc is the length (in number of addresses)
of the code section and n is the number of entry points. Between each entry
point there are a fixed amount of addresses that are not entry points, indicate
6
this number of addresses with Nw. The first entry point is located at address
0, the second one at address Nw and so on; the last one is located at address
n ·Nw such that n ·Nw < nc. Symbolic nonces π are non-guessable, unforgeable
tokens; they model what a program could create using cryptographic primitives
or unguessable randomisation [19, 40]. For the sake of simplicity, they are con-
sidered to be 0 for arithmetic operators.1 Nonce oracles h are used as suppliers
of fresh nonces for the new instruction (see Rule Eval-new in Figure 4). Instruc-
tions i are elements of the set I (Table 1) that define the programming language
executed on the architecture.
movl rd rs ri Load the word from the address in registers (rs,ri) into reg-
ister rd.
movs rd rs ri Store the contents of register rs at the address found in reg-
isters (rd,ri).
movi rd k Load the constant value k into register rd.
add rd rs Write rd + rs into register rd and set the ZF flag accordingly.
sub rd rs Write rd − rs into register rd and set both the ZF and the
SF flags accordingly.
cmp rs rd Compare rs and rd and set the flags accordingly.
jmp rd ri Jump to the address located in register rd in the module
with id ri.
je fi ri If flag fi is set, jump to the address in register ri in the
current module.
zero Set all registers to 0.
new rd Initialise register rd with a fresh symbolic nonce.
halt Stop the execution.
Table 1: Instruction set I.
2.2.3 Modules, Programs and Linking (Figure 3)
To deal with linking, AIL has symbols σ, ι. Symbols in a module are placeholders
for words that will be filled when the module is linked against another one;
symbols can be found in memory and in the symbol table. A symbol table t
contains exported method and object bindings as well as required method and
object bindings. An exported method binding EM (resp. object binding EO)
maps a method name m and its typeMt (resp. an object name o and its class c)
to the address a where the method (resp. class) is located. A required method
binding RM (resp. object binding RO) maps a method name m and its type
Mt (resp. an object name o and its class c) to the id symbol ι and the number
symbol σ used for it. A method (resp. object) export binding fulfils a method
(resp. object) requirement if both bind the same method name and type (resp.
object name and class).
1 Having arithmetic operations affect nonces would only let us model guessing attacks
on them, but they are assumed to be resilient to these attacks so we chose this option for
simplicity.
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modules M ::=(m; s; t) programs P ::=(m; s; t)
symbol tables t ::= EM ;EO;RM ;RO
exported methods EM ::= m :Mt 7→ a
exported objects EO ::= o : c 7→ n
required methods RM ::= m :Mt 7→ ι;σ
required objects RO ::= o : c 7→ σ
Figure 3: Formalisation of AIL (part 2: linking).
A single AIL module M is a triple listing a memory m, its module descrip-
tor s and a symbol table. An AIL program P is a collection of modules whose
module descriptors are listed in s. If the required bindings of a program are
empty lists, then the program is whole. When a program is not whole it is
partial, i.e., it is a collection of modules with a symbol table with unfulfilled re-
quirements. Informally, two AIL programs P1 and P2 satisfy each other, denoted
with P1⌢P2, if all the required bindings of P1 are fulfilled by a binding in P2
and vice-versa. Modules and programs are well-formed if the only symbols in
their memory are those captured in the symbol table. In the following, we only
consider well-formed programs and modules.
Two memories (resp. two module descriptors) agree if their domains are dis-
joint (resp. if their ids are distinct). Two AIL modules P1 and P2 can be joined
together, denoted with P1+P2, only if the two memories and if the memory
descriptors agree. Joining of modules results in a program that is the con-
catenation of the memories, memory descriptors and symbol tables of P1 and
P2. Joining of symbol tables results in a new symbol table. If a requirement
(method or object) is fulfilled by a requirement in another table, that require-
ment is removed from the resulting table. Moreover, in the resulting memory,
all symbols of fulfilled requirements are replaced with what is bound by the
fulfiller requirement. Consider P1 to require method m : Mt 7→ ι;σ and P2 to
export method m : Mt 7→ (id, n). When merging P1 and P2, all occurrences of
ι and σ in the memory of P1 will be replaced with id and n, respectively. The
resulting symbol table will no longer have the requirement for m :Mt as that
has been fulfilled.
2.2.4 Dynamic Semantics of AIL
The dynamic semantics of whole programs (→→) relates program states (p, r, f ,m, s, h)
where p is the program counter (i.e., an address). This semantics relies on
another one for modules (
id−−→→); the latter tells when a module with id id
performs a reduction (Rule Eval-single-to-multiple-modules). Figure 4 shows
an excerpt of the reduction rules. Memory access is indicated as: m(a) = w;
memory update is indicated as m[a 7→ w]. The same notation is adopted for
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(Eval-new)
p = (id, n) m(p) = new rd r
′ = r[rd 7→ pi] pi /∈ h
(p, r, f,m, s, pi;h)
id−−→→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ,m, s, h)
(Eval-module)
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→→ (p′, r′, f ′,m′, s′, h′)
p ⊢ currentModule(s, s) p = (id, n)
(p, r, f,m, s, h)→→ (p′, r′, f ′, m′, s, h′)
(Eval-movs)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (movs rd rs ri)
s ⊢ writeAllowed(n, (r(rd), r(ri)))
m′ = m[(r(rd), r(ri)) 7→ r(rs)]
(p, r, f,m, s, h) →→ ((id, n+ 1), r, f,m′, s, h)
(Eval-jmp)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (jmp rd ri) n
′ = r(rd)
id′ = r(ri) r
′ = r′[r0 7→ id] s ⊢ validJump(p, (id′, n′))
(p, r, f,m, s, h) →→ ((id′, n′), r′, f ,m, s, h)
Figure 4: An excerpt of the dynamic semantics of AIL
register files and flags register access and update. Assumptions of the form
s ⊢ name(a, a′) model the enforcement of the PMA access control policy; their
names are self-explanatory. For example, s ⊢ writeAllowed(n, n′) tells if an ad-
dress n′ can be written from another address n and s ⊢ validJump(a, a′) tells
if address a′ is executable (x) from address a. p ⊢ currentModule(s, s) tells
whether the program counter p is in a specific module whose descriptor is s
where s is within s. Instruction jmp is the only instruction that can perform
cross-module jumps (Rule Eval-jmp). When a cross-module jump is performed,
the PMA architecture inserts the id of the caller in register r0. This function-
ality is called caller-callee authentication; some PMA implementations provide
it [39, 31] and it is achievable on Intel SGX by means of the EREPORT instruc-
tion [16]. Whenever the execution of an instruction violates the PMA access
control policy (e.g., jumping to a module address that is not an entry point),
the execution is terminated.
2.2.5 Contextual Equivalence for AIL
Analogously to JEM, to reason about AIL components we define when they are
contextually equivalent. Contexts P are partial programs with a hole ([·]) that
can be filled with a component in order to create a whole program, formally
P ::= P [·]. Plugging a component P in a context P, denoted as P[P ], returns a
whole program P+P , given that P ⌢P.
Contextual equivalence for languages with oracles relies on a notion of con-
textual preorder [3] which is needed to ensure obvious equivalences are satisfied
(Example 1).
Example 1 (Need for preorders). Consider a module Pn2 that generates two
nonces and returns only one and another one Pn1 that generates and returns
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one nonce only. These programs are intuitively equivalent, but a contextual
equivalence definition analogous to that for JEM simply does not yield this fact
because we cannot quantify over all oracles and use the same oracle for both
programs. Given that Pn1 runs with an oracle h1, Pn2 has the same behaviour
if it runs with an oracle h2 that has all elements of h1 interleaved with fresh
elements. Dually, given that Pn2 runs with an oracle h2, Pn2 has the same
behaviour if it runs with an oracle h1 that has only the even-numbered elements
of h2. 
Definition 2 (Contextual preorder for AIL). P1❁∼P2 , ∀P, h1, ∃h2.P[P1], h1⇑ ⇒
P[P2], h2⇑, where P[P ], h indicates the initial state of P+P with oracle h.
Definition 3 (Contextual equivalence for AIL). P1≃ctx P2 , P1❁∼P2 and P2❁∼P1.
3 Security Pitfalls
This section describes the threat model considered in this paper (Section 3.1)
and the security pitfalls that arise when linking is explicitly considered (Sec-
tion 3.2).
3.1 The Threat Model
The goal of this section is to familiarise the reader with the security aspects
of secure compilation that are relevant for this paper. We do not provide an
in-depth analysis of these aspects as they are not the focus of this paper, though
we believe these insights can be helpful for many readers.
Secure compilation papers generally consider a threat model for an attacker
with target-level code injection capabilities that operates, for example, by ex-
ploiting a bug in the system and injecting or loading arbitrary target programs.
His goal is to violate the security properties of compiled programs found in
the system. Specifically, in this paper we consider an attacker that can load
arbitrary malicious code.
In this paper, the system is the von Neumann machine formalised by the
AIL language, where multiple protected modules are found. The compiled pro-
grams that the attacker wants to violate span some of the protected modules,
as explained in Section 1; their security properties must not be violated. The
attacker is modelled as code (and data) that spans unprotected memory as well
as other protected modules; thus the attacker is modelled as an AIL context.
This attacker can interact with any of the compiled programs whose security is
of interest in any way that the assembly language (and the PMA access control
policy) allow him. Thus, the attacker must respect the processor-enforced PMA
access control policy and, most importantly, he cannot tamper with it.
We are interested in program security properties that can be expressed by
means of contextual equivalence; some examples include confidentiality and in-
tegrity. A value is confidential if it cannot be discerned by other components
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than the one declaring it. In other words, a value v in a component C is confi-
dential if C is contextually-equivalent to C′ which is C with a different value for
v. Integrity of a value means that it cannot be modified by other components
than the one declaring it. In other words, a value v in a component C has in-
tegrity if C is contextually-equivalent to C′ which is C where every interaction
with other component is followed by a check that the value of v is the same as
before the interaction.
The goal of the paper is to provide a compiler J·KJEMAIL that produces secure AIL
modules. Thus, J · KJEMAIL takes JEM components that possibly has some security
properties and outputs AIL modules that has the same security properties. If
this holds, then the attacker’s goal is nullified.
As compiler full-abstraction is preservation and reflection of contextual equiv-
alence, proving J · KJEMAIL to be fully-abstract implies that J · KJEMAIL is secure.
3.2 Security Problems Related to Linking
Problems 1 to 4 are full-abstraction violations that arise in the presence of
linking. Any full-abstraction violation can be lead back to confidentiality or
integrity violations.
Problem 1 (Object id guessing). Consider an object allocated at address a in
module M1 and that is only shared between two modules M1 and M2. As object
ids are just addresses in memory, nothing prevents another module M3 to guess
address a and call methods on it. Note however, that this violates the intended
confidentiality of a, that is supposed to be visible only to M1 and M2.
A na¨ıve solution to this problem is tracking which module will receive a cer-
tain object id in order to detect and stop guesses from modules that have not
received that object id. However, this does not scale to the case where M2 for-
wards a to M3. Since the forwarding is done outside of M1, M1 has no way
of adding M3 to the modules that are allowed to access a. As this may not be
known statically, a different solution is needed.
To address this concern, target-level object ids must be unguessable. 
Problem 2 (Call stack shortcutting). As all assembly languages, AIL calls and
returns are jumps to addresses in memory. Consider the following sequence of
cross-module function calls: M2 → M → M1 → M ′, where primes are used to
denote subsequent calls to the same module.
M ′ can return to M2, as it learnt the address to return there when M2 called
it. However, that instruction bypasses the rest of the call stack and particularly
M1 in a way that is not possible in the source language, where control flow
follows a well-bracketed sequence of calls/returns.
To address this concern, securely compiled code must ensure a well-bracketed
traversal of the stack. 
Problem 3 (Types of objects in other modules). Consider an object of type
t′ allocated at address a in module M1 and a method m compiled in a different
module M2 that takes a parameter of type t. t and t
′ are different. A third
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module M3 could pass a as an argument to the compilation of m, violating the
JEM assumption that only well-typed programs are executed. A dynamic check
on the type of a should be made, but the code of m resides in M2 and it has no
way to access a, which resides in module M1.
To address this concern, dynamic typechecks must be made on all objects that
are passed and received via methods and the encoding of the class of an object
must be accessible outside of the module containing the object. 
Problem 4 (Existence of objects in other modules). Analogously, to Problem 3,
in place of an object of the wrong type, M3 code can call the compilation of m by
passing a non-existent object id. A non-existent object id is a non-null object
id that does not point to an object, so that calling methods on it will fail.
To address this concern, when securely compiled code receives an object from
another module, it must assess whether that object exists or not. 
4 A Secure Compiler from JEM to AIL
J · KJEMAIL is a modular, two-step compiler that inputs a JEM class C and returns
two AIL modules. Formally:
JCK
JEM
AIL = protect((|C|))+JSysKJEMAIL .
J · KJEMAIL consists of a call to the (| · |) function (Section 4.1), followed by a call
to the protect( · ) one (Section 4.3). The result is joined with an additional
module JSysK
JEM
AIL (Section 4.2).
Intuitively, (| · |) is a compiler responsible for correctly translating classes,
methods and objects to assembly. protect( · ) is a wrapper around the code
generated by (| · |) that prevents direct access to that code and ensures that
any interaction with that code is regulated to behave as valid JEM code. This
wrapping ensures that the output of J · KJEMAIL is secure. JSysKJEMAIL is a central,
trusted module that operates as a monitor, regulating the structure of function
calls and keeping information of allocated objects.
J · KJEMAIL is modular, i.e., it can be applied to JEM components C. In this
case J · KJEMAIL recursively calls itself on all classes composing the JEM component.
The secure linker link( · ) combines all compiled components to a low-level
component (Section 4.4). Formally:
JC1; · · · ;CnKJEMAIL = link(JC1KJEMAIL , · · · , JCnKJEMAIL )
The overall structure of the compiler proposed in this paper is similar to the
one for a single-module version of PMA [35], but two important extensions are
needed to handle the issues (Items 1 and 2) mentioned in Section 1:
1. we introduce a small centralized trusted module JSysK
JEM
AIL that keeps in-
formation about the global control flow of the program, and about types
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of objects shared between multiple modules. A key challenge is to de-
sign this module such that the information it exposes does not break full
abstraction (Section 4.2).
2. we introduce unforgeable object references. Since we do not want to as-
sume hardware support for this (as is done for instance in capability ma-
chines), we solve this by assuming the existence of a secure random number
generator that can create unguessable random numbers (nonces) that are
sufficiently large to make brute-force attacks infeasible (as achievable via
the rdrand instruction of intel processors [22]). We model these nonces
symbolically (i.e., π) and use them to represent references to objects out-
side of the module where the object is defined (Section 4.3.1).
4.1 The First Step: (| · |)
(|·|) is a compiler that translates a single JEM class to AIL code, data and a symbol
table. Instead of giving a specific instance of (| · |), we define what assumptions
(Assumption 1, 2 and 4) such a compiler must uphold for the full-abstraction
result to hold. The full-abstraction result is achieved parametrically for any (| · |)
that upholds those assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Output of (| · |)). The compilation of a JEM class returns a
memory mc providing code implementing methods M , a memory md providing
data implementing objects O and a symbol table t. t contains exported and
required methods and objects bindings sorted lexicographically by class and then
method or object name [35].
The produced code and data implement a class-local stack that is used to
perform calls and returns between methods.
(| · |) is multi-entry i.e., it exports an address for each method that can be
called. (| · |) is single-exit i.e., all jumps outside the code are performed by a
common piece of code located in a known part of the produced code: mexit. (| · |)
expects the address where instanceof is implemented to be supplied later, so a
call to instanceof is compiled to symbols (ιinst, σinst) which capture both parts
of the address where instanceof is. This is captured by the required bindings
with a binding of the form instanceof : Obj(Obj, Obj)Bool 7→ (ιinst, σinst) which
must be in t.
JEM object ids o are compiled to numbers n that point to a memory region
with type information and fields.
Formally: (|import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O|) = (mc+mexit+minst;md; t).
We overload the (| · |) notation and use it to indicate values as are compiled
by (| · |). Indicate the compilation of unit as (|unit|) and the compilation of true
as (|true|). Analogously, indicate the encoding of JEM types t in AIL as (|t|). For
example, indicate the encoding of Unit as (|Unit|) and the encoding of a class
type c as a natural number (|c|) = n.
Assumption 2 (Calling convention of (| · |)). Registers are used according to
the following calling convention. r0 is used by caller-callee authentication to
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store the caller module id. r1 to r4 are used as general working registers, so
they do not contain relevant information. r5 identifies the return address in
a jmp that models a method call; if r5 is 1, then that jmp is interpreted as a
return. r6 identifies the current object (this) in a target-level method call or
the returned value in a target-level return. r7 onwards are used to communicate
method parameters.
Assumption 3 (Restrictions of (| · |)). Compiled components do not use the
exit E expression. Addiitonally, they do not read nor write to unprotected
memory.
Assumption 4 (Correctness of (| · |)). (| · |) must be correct and adequate, i.e.,
it translates any JEM expressions and values into AIL code that behaves in the
same way [23, 12, 28].
4.2 The System Module: JSysKJEMAIL
The system module JSysKJEMAIL is a central, trusted module that provides func-
tionality used by all securely-compiled components. JSysK
JEM
AIL contains: a global
store G (Section 4.2.1), a global call stack S (Section 4.2.2) and functionality
to interact with G and S (Section 4.2.3); its definition is provided last (Sec-
tion 4.2.4).
In the following, when code aborts we mean that all registers and flags are
reset, then halt is executed.
4.2.1 The Global Store G
G tracks globally-known object ids (i.e., ids that are not just local to a module),
their type and the module id where the object resides. Formally G = w 7→ w′, id,
where w is an object id and w′ is a class encoding. Retrieval from G is denoted
with G(w) and addition to it is denoted with G + (w 7→ w′, id).
JSysK
JEM
AIL provides two entry points where the following procedures are imple-
mented: testObj(w,w′) and registerObj(w,w′). The former tells if an object
w exists and implements a certain class w′. The latter adds a new binding to
G, the new binding is added for the module whose id is in r(r0), i.e., for the
module that calls registerObj( · ). Parameters w and w′ for these procedures
are expected respectively in registers r7 and r8.
testObj(w,w′)
if w /∈ dom(G) then abort
if G(w) ≡ (w′, ) then
return 0
else return 1
registerObj(w,w′)
if w ∈ dom(G) then abort
G + w 7→ w′, r(r0)
return 0
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4.2.2 The Global Call Stack S
S tracks all AIL-level function calls. Formally, S = (a).
JSysKJEMAIL provides the following procedures implemented at entry points:
forwardCall() and forwardReturn(). Both procedures use the following helper
functions: resetFlags( · ) sets flags to 0, resetRegisters( · ) inputs the reg-
isters that need to be reset to 0 and resetRegistersExcept( · ) inputs the
registers that need not be reset to 0.
forwardCall() reads an address from r3 and r4 and forwards the call there.
Before forwarding, it stores in S the addess where to return as passed via reg-
isters r0 and r5. In order to ensure a correct return, the procedure stores the
address of the entry point for forwardReturn() (i.e., 3 ∗ Nw) in r5. Since the
caller id is placed in r0 by the caller-callee authentication mechanism of PMA,
it cannot be tampered with. This procedure aborts if the module jumping here
is the one that jumped here last (if any) or if the address where the call is
forwarded is inside JSysKJEMAIL .
forwardCall()
If S 6= ∅
Let S = (id, );S ′
if r(r0) == id then abort
if r(r3) == 1 then abort
Push (r(r0), r(r5)) on S
Set r5 to 3 ∗ Nw
resetFlags()
resetRegisters(r0, r1, r2)
jmp r3 r4
forwardReturn() pops the head of the stack and returns there, setting r5
to 1 as expected in the case for returns. If the call stack is empty, it aborts to
prevent returning when no code was called. If the id of the caller module stored
on S is different from the id of the module jumping to this procedure, it aborts,
as it detects a non-well-bracketed execution flow.
forwardReturn()
If S = ∅ then abort
Pop (id,n) from S into r2 and r1
if id 6= r(r0) then abort
Set r5 to 1;
resetFlags()
resetRegistersExcept(r1, r2, r5, r6)
jmp r1 r2 // i.e., jump to address (id,n)
The calling convention is updated as follows: calls to different modules must
go via JSysK
JEM
AIL , with registers r3 and r4 set to the method that needed to be
called. Both these procedures do not use registers r6 onwards, so they do not
alter the calling convention regarding parameters and returned values.
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4.2.3 Functionality of JSysK
JEM
AIL
The addition of JSysK
JEM
AIL may seem to violate full abstraction as it provides
target-level functionality that are not available in JEM [1]. Let us now see why
this is not the case.
Procedure testObj( · ) is analogous to the instanceof expression in JEM.
This procedure aborts when the object id parameter is not registered in G i.e.,
an ill-formed execution of instanceof. Aborting in this case lets JSysK
JEM
AIL
prevent object id guessing (Problem 1).
Procedure registerObj( · ) is analogous to object creation. This procedure
aborts when the object id is already registered; aborting in this case ensures
that object ids are globally unique.
Procedure forwardCall( · ) is analogous to performing a function call. This
procedure aborts when the same module performs two calls in a row without
there being a return in between or if it performs a call to JSysKJEMAIL as those
behaviours are not available in JEM.
Procedure forwardReturn( · ) is analogous to returning from a function call.
This procedure aborts when a return is not made by the module who was called
last. This enforces well-bracketed control flow, preventing Problem 2 as well as
external code returning when no method was called.
All the procedures implemented in JSysK
JEM
AIL add functionality in AIL that is
already available in JEM, so adding JSysK
JEM
AIL when linking AIL components does
not violate full-abstraction.
4.2.4 JSysK
JEM
AIL Definition
Assume the functions provided by JSysK
JEM
AIL span memory m, whose size is n
addresses. Let the data needed by these functions plus the initialisation of G
and S span memory m′. JSysKJEMAIL is always compiled to a module with id 1
(since 0 is the id of unprotected code) and it is defined as follows:
(m+m′; (1, n, 4);EMto, EMro, EMrc, EMtr; ∅; ∅; ∅)
JSysK
JEM
AIL exports a method binding for each procedure it defines; it has no
exported object bindings and no required bindings.
• EMto = testObj : Obj(Obj, Obj)Bool 7→ (1, 0)
• EMro = registerObj : Obj(Obj, Obj)Unit 7→ (1,Nw)
• EMrc = forwardCall : Obj(·)Unit 7→ (1, 2 ∗ Nw)
• EMtr = forwardReturn : Obj(·)Unit 7→ (1, 3 ∗ Nw)
J · KJEMAIL knows the offset of all procedures defined in JSysKJEMAIL , so it can
perform calls to them. For example a call to registerObj( · ) is a jmp rd ri
where r(rd) 7→ Nw and r(ri) 7→ 1.
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4.3 The Second Step: protect( · )
The protect( · ) function is a wrapper that takes the memory generated by
(| · |) and adds checks to it, making it secure. This section first presents the
required helper functions to compile JEM features: dynamic memory allocation
(Section 4.3.1), function calls (Section 4.3.2) and outcalls (Section 4.3.3). The
definition of protect( · ) is provided last (Section 4.3.4).
4.3.1 Dynamic memory allocation
Dynamic memory allocation is the creation of objects at runtime via the new
expression in JEM. The representation of an object id within a compiled com-
ponent does not change. To ensure security of object ids when communicated
between AIL modules, object ids are no longer just an address in memory, they
are symbolic nonces. The latter are called cross-module object ids and they
are denoted with JoK
JEM
AIL . Formally: JoK
JEM
AIL = π. Symbolic nonces cannot be
forged nor guessed, so the format of cross-module object ids addresses Prob-
lem 1. Cross-module object ids being a symbolic nonce instead of an address
does not disrupt the functionality of compiled JEM code, which functions in the
same way as before.
To relate cross-module and internal object ids within a module, masking
tables are used [35]. A masking table, indicated with T , is a bidirectional hash
map between internal object id representations and cross-module ones; each
module has its own masking table. Formally T ::= w 7→ π. Before an (internal)
object id w is first passed to external code, it is placed in the table. This process
is called masking, thus the passed id π is called the mask. Denote the retrieval
of a mask π with T (π) and the retrieval of an internal object id w with T (w).
Any retrieval causes abortion if the element to be retrieved is not in T . Adding
an internal object id w to a table T is denoted with T +w; the binding w 7→ π,
where π is fresh, is added to T .
Next are the functions used to manage masking tables.
A compiled component must store the encoding of the class it contains for
helper functions to rely on. Function classOf(n) returns the encoding of the
class implemented by the object compiled at address n in the current module.
Function isInternal(w) takes a class type encoding and returns true if the
current module implements that class.
Function updateMaskingTable(w, n) inputs a pair of an internal object id
and a class type encoding. This function is invoked before releasing an object
to external code to add the id of freshly-allocated object to the masking table.
This function retrieves the class of the object and then checks if that object id
is already in the masking table; if not, it adds the id to the table and registers
its cross-module id globally. Retrieving the class object may be necessary, as
some arguments may have formal type Obj. A crucial part of this function is
the call to registerObj(T (w), n′), which makes the information that object w,
with cross-module id T (w), implements class n′ globally available via JSysKJEMAIL .
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updateMaskingTable(w, n)
if n is a class type encoding then
let n′ = classOf(w)
if isInternal(n′) and if w /∈ dom(T ) then
T +w ; registerObj(T (w), n′)
Function loadObjects( · ) loads the internal object ids of the masking in-
dexes that are passed as input into the related register.
loadObjects(pi1, · · · , pin)
∀i ∈ 1..k r(ri) 7→ T (pii)
Function maskingTable(EO) creates the masking table for all exported ob-
jects bindings listed in EO.
maskingTable(o1 : c1 7→ n1, · · · , ok : ck 7→ nk) = T
∀i ∈ 1..k let wi = new r0 T = n1 7→ w1, · · · , nk 7→ wk
4.3.2 Function calls
Function calls are calls from outside to within a compiled module. The PMA
access control policy ensures that these calls can only be calls to entry points.
Therefore, an entry point is created for all methods [35]. Function methodEP(Mt, n)
creates the code to be placed at a method entry point for a method with sig-
nature Mt whose implementation is located at address (id, n) in the current
module with id id. Following is the pseudo-code of method entry points; nota-
tion n 7→ code means that n is the address where code is located.
methodEP(t(t1, · · · , tk)→ t′, n) =
If r(r0) 6= 1 or r(r5) 6= 3 ∗ Nw then abort
loadObjects(r(r6), r(r7), · · · , r(r6+k))
dynamicTypechecks(r(r6), (|t|))
for i = 1 to k
dynamicTypechecks(r(r6+i), (|ti|))
n′ 7→ Set r5 to n′ + 1 and jump to module-local address n
updateMaskingTable(r(r6), (|t′|))
maskObjectId(6)
Set r5 to 1 and jmp to the address (1,3*Nw)
Upon jumping to an entry point, a check is made that the jump comes from
the JSysK
JEM
AIL module and that the return address is the forwardReturn( · )
address (i.e., 3 ∗ Nw in a module whose id is 1). If this is not the case, execu-
tion is aborted as some code is trying to bypass JSysKJEMAIL . All data needed for
this check is known statically Then, masked object ids are loaded via function
loadObjects( · ). Only parameters of object type are loaded; if a parameter
could not be loaded, the execution is aborted. Once the objects are loaded,
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dynamic typechecks are made via function dynamicTypechecks( · ) (explained
below). These checks are located inside the module where class t is compiled, so
checking that the current object (r6) is of type (|t|) is equivalent to checking that
the current object implements the current method. Then the code jumps to the
method body located at address n setting r5 to the address where that code must
return. There, current arguments are placed on the module-local stack alongside
other information required by function activation records. When the method
body returns (to address n′ + 1), the masking table is (possibly) updated with
the value to be returned (in r6) via function updateMaskingTable( · ) and in-
ternal object ids in registers are masked via function maskObjectId( · ).
Let us now provide details about the auxiliary functions.
dynamicTypechecks( · ) ensures that each parameter inhabits its type. Unit-
typed values are checked to be (|unit|) and Bool-typed ones are checked to
be either (|true|) or (|false|) [35, 20]. Objects are dynamically typechecked
by means of the testObj( · ) function (as discussed in Section 4.2). If any
check fails, the execution is aborted. By checking the existence and types of all
parameters, securely compiled code is resilient to Problems 3 and 4.
dynamicTypechecks(w, n)
if n ≡ (|Unit|) then if w 6= (|unit|) then abort
if n ≡ (|Bool|) then if w 6= (|true|) and w 6= (|false|) then abort
if n is a class type and w 6= (|null|) then
if testObj(w, n) == 1 then abort
Function maskObjectId( · ) inputs the index of the register to mask and
loads a cross-module object id there.
maskObjectId(n)
r(rn) 7→ T (r(rn))
4.3.3 Outcalls
Outcalls are the dual of function calls, i.e., they are calls from within to outside
a module. To allow returning from outcalls, a specific entry point must be
created: the return entry point [35].
Function preamble( · ) returns what all code must execute before making an
outcall, function returnEP( · ) returns the code m to be placed at the return
entry point.
The preamble code is executed before jumping to an external method lo-
cated at address a, assume this address is communicated via registers r0 and
r1. Compiled code will execute the preamble( · ) before jumping outside to
ensure the right checks are made. signatureOf( · ) is used to determine the sig-
nature of the compiled method related to a. All method signatures are known
statically so their signature encoding can be stored in a table mapping addresses
to signature encodings; the table is placed in the data section of the module.
This data is communicated to protect( · ) via the required method bindings
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preamble() =
Let a be the address where the external method is; a ≡ (id, w)
signatureOf(a) = (|t|)((|t1|), · · · , (|tn|)) → (|t′|)
storeData(r(r6), (|t′|), r(r5))
for i = 1 to n
updateMaskingTable(r(r6+i), (|ti|))
maskObjectId(6 + i)
resetRegistersExcept(r0, · · · , r6+n)
Set r(r3) to id and r(r4) to w
Call forwardCall( · )
RM returned by (| · |). preamble() then calls to storeData( · ), which stores the
current object r6, the expected return type (|t′|), and where to resume the exe-
cution after the outcall, an address that is assumed to be passed in r5. For any
parameter, the masking table is updated with any possible newly created object
via function updateMaskingTable( · ) and their ids are masked with function
maskObjectId( · ). Then, registers that are not used to convey parameters nor
the address where to jump are reset to 0 by function resetRegistersExcept( · )
in order not to leak information (JSysK
JEM
AIL will erase unused registers with index
less than 6). This ensures that r5 contains 0, so JSysK
JEM
AIL will return to the
return entry point located at address 0 when forwarding the return after this
call. Finally the code sets r3 and r4 as expected by JSysK
JEM
AIL , then it jumps to
the proxy function for method calls: forwardCall().
returnEP() =
0 7→ If r(r0) 6= 1 then abort
loadData() // access wo, (|t′|), n′
loadObjects(r(r6))
dynamicTypechecks(r(r6), (|t′|))
Resume execution from address n′ with current object wo
When a return is made, if the module returning is not JSysKJEMAIL (i.e., a
module with id 1), then the code aborts, as some code is trying to bypass
JSysK
JEM
AIL . Then, the current object wo, the expected return type (|t|) and the
address where to resume execution n′ are loaded from the module-local stack
via function loadData( · ) into registers r7 onwards (since these registers are
unused). Finally, the returned value r6 is checked to be of the expected type.
Execution aborts if any check fails, otherwise it resumes within the module with
the loaded current object.
4.3.4 The protect( · ) function
protect( · ) is formalised in Rule protect( · ) definition.
To ensure that the compiler is correct, protect( · ) needs to provide an
implementation of instanceof, addressing Problem 5 below.
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Problem 5 (Using instanceof). Consider a module M that contains ob-
ject o implementing class c. Another module M1 executes the following code:
instanceof(o : c). In order to tell if the test succeeds or not, the code of M1
must know the class of o. However, with the strong encapsulation provided by
PMA, that information resides in the memory of M , which is not accessible by
M1. 
To correctly implement cross-module instanceof, the class of an object
needs to be publicly known, which is a functionality provided by JSysK
JEM
AIL .
When calling instanceof on an object whose type is implemented in another
module, it suffices to call testObj( · ) to know if the test succeeds or not. To en-
sure this happens, the required method binding for instanceof is replaced with
a method binding for the same symbols to testObj( · ). Linking to JSysKJEMAIL
will ensure that those symbols are replaced with the address of testObj( · ).
(protect( · ) definition)
(|C|) = (mc +mexit;md;EM ;EO;RM +RMi;RO)
EM = m1 :Mt1 7→ (id, n1), · · · , mk :Mtk 7→ (id, nk)
EM ′ = m1 : Mt1 7→ a1, · · · , mk :Mtk 7→ ak
EO = o1 : c1 7→ n′′1 , · · · , oj : cj 7→ n′′j
EO′ = o1 : c1 7→ T (n′′1 ), · · · , oj : cj 7→ T (n′′j )
RMi = instanceof : Obj(Obj, Obj)Bool 7→ (ιinst, σinst)
RM ′i = testObject : Obj(Obj, Obj)Bool 7→ (ιinst, σinst)
s = (id, n′, k + 1) maskingTable(EO) = T
mm = implementationOf(T ) mr = returnEP()
mce = extraCode() mde = extraData()
∀i ∈ 1..k ai = (id, i · Nw) mi = methodEP(Mti, ni)
m′exit = append(mexit, preamble( · ))
mcode = m1 + · · ·+mk +mr +mc +m′exit +mce
n′ = |mcode| m = mcode +md +mde +mm
protect((|C|)) = m; s;EM ′;EO′;RM +RM ′i ;RO
protect( · ) calculates the memory layout s based on the functionality listed
in EM . The memory created by protect( · ) contains the following functional-
ity. Each method exported to external code is given an entry point with code
created with the methodEP( · ) function. Function returnEP( · ) yields memory
mr for the return entry point. The code section of m is completed with the
extraCode( · ), containing the implementation of all the helper functions de-
scribed above (e.g., dynamicTypechecks( · ), resetFlagsAndRegs( · ) etc.) and
with mc, the code generated by (| · |). Additionally, the code section appends
the preamble( · ) procedure at the exit-point code provided by (| · |) to ensure
that it is always executed before exiting the module. After the code section, m
contains extraData( · ), i.e., all the data needed by the helper functions (e.g.,
the encodings of method signatures and of types) and by md, the data gener-
ated by (| · |). Finally the data section contains the masking table mm, which
is obtained with function maskingTable( · ); as memories are infinite, the data
section of a module has no boundaries.
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What protect( · ) returns exports the same methods and objects as (| · |).
The former are bound to entry points and the latter have their ids masked.
4.4 The Secure Linker: link( · )
This section presents function link( · ), which inputs and returns AIL modules;
it is formalised as follows:
link(P, P ′) = M1 ⊎ · · · ⊎Mn ⊎M ′1 ⊎ · · · ⊎M ′m
where P ≡M1 ⊎ · · · ⊎Mn
and P ′ ≡M ′1 ⊎ · · · ⊎M ′m
Modules Mi are obtained through calls to J · KJEMAIL , they all are a pair of a
compiled JEM class and an instance of JSysKJEMAIL . Informally, the ⊎ operator
does the following:
• it performs AIL-level joining of modules (+, presented in Section 2.2.2)
ensuring that only one occurrence of JSysK
JEM
AIL is present in the resulting
component;
• it initialises the resulting JSysKJEMAIL table G with all exported object bind-
ings for all Mi, so that static objects are registered in G.
5 Discussion
This section presents how to extend J · KJEMAIL to a source language supporting
object-orientation (Section 5.1) and how to support multi-register data (Sec-
tion 5.2).
5.1 Supporting Object-Orientation
JEM can be made object-oriented by adding support for interfaces, inheritance
and dynamic dispatch. We suggest doing this by adding interfaces to JEM,
making class types private to a component and only using interface types in
the types of cross-component method calls and returns [25, 35]. Since different
JEM components can implement the same interface, a number of concerns arise.
Nevertheless, we believe the concerns can be adequately addressed and this
section also describes a possible change to our compiler which we believe is a
way to solve the concerns.
Problem 6 (Module id at the target level). Consider two modules M1 and M2
containing the compilation of two classes that implements the same interface i.
Code in another module M could input objects of that interface. However, M
cannot be sure of where the object id is located unless it indicates its module id.
In fact, all that M knowns when receiving an argument is the type i, but both
M1 and M2 implement it. 
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To address Problem 6, cross-module object ids need to state the module id
where they reside; formally JoK
JEM
AIL = π, id. Unless AIL is extended to merge this
information in nonces, object ids span multiple words (Section 5.2 describes how
to securely compile them).
Often, object-oriented languages implements dynamic dispatch as vtables
that are located at the address where an object is compiled. With PMA, M1
has no access to the vtable of o if o is allocated inM2. The single-module version
of AIL [35] used entry points as a vtable but this does not hold when multiple
modules are considered.
Problem 7 (Dynamic dispatch). Consider two modules M1 and M2 containing
the compilation of two classes implementing the same interface Bank. Module
M1 also implements interface Account while module M2 also implements inter-
face Currency. Since methods need to be sorted alphabetically based on their
namespaces (which include interface names), methods for Bank in M1 will have
different entry points than the same methods in M2.
A module M interacting with M1 and M2 however should not need to know
the full specification of which component contains which interfaces, as this would
defeat the purpose of object orientation. All that M knows is that somewhere
outside its memory, interface Bank is implemented. When receiving an object
from M1 or from M2 that implements the Bank interface, M needs to be able
to calculate where to jump in order to call methods on it. 
To address Problem 7, a single method entry point is created at address Nw
instead of an entry point per method implemented in a component. That entry
point serves as a dynamic dispatch entry point. All cross-module method calls
update the calling convention to use r6 as a container for the encoding of the
method to be called. Formally, indicate a method encoding as follows (|m|) = n.
When a module receives an object id of the form π, id, it can call method m
on it by jumping to address (id, 0) and setting r6 to (|m|). Parameters and the
current object are then passed via registers r7 onwards.
The dynamic dispatch entry point must perform a new check: r6 must be
a valid method encoding. All methods implemented in interfaces are known
statically, so a module can save this information in its memory to encode this
check. If this check succeeds, the execution continues by dispatching to the
checks for method entry points of Section 4.3.
5.2 Supporting Multi-Register Data
In some cases, securely-compiled code needs to communicate data that spans
multiple registers. For example, the source language could be extended to sup-
port computation on complex numbers, or the format of object ids could vary
(as discussed in Section 5.1). Communicating data that spans multiple registers
can be done by extending AIL with cryptographic functions (either in the form
of instructions, as presented here, or as module-internal procedures).
First, all modules must have a public and a private key, all modules know
each other’s public keys but the private one is confidential to the module [31].
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Second, cryptograhic functions for signing and verifying signatures are needed.
sign rs re rk rd Sign all registers from rs to re
with the (private) key found in
register rk and place the result
in register rd.
verify rs re rk rd Set the ZF according to whether
the signature found in register
rd has been created for all regis-
ters from rs to re with the dual
key of that found in register rk.
Consider the case of multi-register object ids of Section 5.1; cross-module ob-
ject ids need to be changed into a triplet, so they span three registers. The triplet
consists of: a masking index (as in Section 4.3), a type encoding and a signature
of the two; the signature prevents Problem 8 below; Formally: JoKJEMAIL = π, n, w.
Problem 8 (Object-id shuﬄing). Consider two objects o1 and o2 residing in
two modulesM1 andM2 implementing two different classes. Without signatures,
those objects would have the following cross-module object ids: Jo1K
JEM
AIL = π1, n1
and Jo2K
JEM
AIL = π2, n2. An attacker can forge new object ids as follows: π1, n2
and π2, n1. Another module M3 receiving the forged objects from the attacker
has no way to tell whether they are forged by inspecting them. 
With the signature in place, the object ids of o1 and o2 change as follows:
Jo1K
JEM
AIL = π1, n1, w1 and Jo2K
JEM
AIL = π2, n2, w2. An attacker can still forge object
ids by creating π1, n2, w2, but M3 can verify the signature part of the triplet,
therefore finding out when forgery has taken place.
With this approach, some auxiliary functions need to be changed. Function
loadObjects( · ) needs to verify that the object ids of all externally-located
modules have been signed with the proper key and that the key corresponds to
the module that implements the class n mentioned in the object id. As a module
implements a single class, the type encoding tells a module which public key to
use for the verification. Function updateMaskingTable( · ) needs to ensure that
communicated cross-module object id are signed.
Concerning JSysK
JEM
AIL , registerObj( · ) is not needed and the pseudo code
inserted by protect( · ) does not call it. Procedure testObj( · ) can be imple-
mented locally in a module, since due to the new cross-module object ids the
type of an object is part of its id.
6 Full-Abstraction and Modularity of J · KJEMAIL
As stated in Section 1, a compiler is fully-abstract if it preserves and reflects
contextual equivalence of source and target components. This section briefly
discusses how contextual equivalence is reflected (Section 6.1) and preserved
(Section 6.2) for J · KJEMAIL . Then it concludes by presenting the proof sketch of
full-abstraction and modular full-abstraction of J · KJEMAIL (Section 6.3).
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6.1 J · KJEMAIL Reflects Contextual Equivalence
Proving that J · KJEMAIL reflects contextual equivalence (Theorem 1) is analogous
to proving that it is correct and adequate.
Theorem 1 (J·KJEMAIL preserves behaviour). ∀C1, C2.JC1KJEMAIL ≃ctx JC2KJEMAIL ⇒ C1≃ctx C2.
Intuitively, given Assumption 4, this holds because neither protect( · ) nor
the addition of JSysK
JEM
AIL change the semantics of compiled programs.
6.2 J · KJEMAIL Preserves Contextual Equivalence
Proving that J · KJEMAIL preserves contextual equivalence (Theorem 2) is analo-
gous to proving that J · KJEMAIL is secure. Theorem 2 intuitively states that JEM
abstractions are preserved in the AIL output J · KJEMAIL produces.
Theorem 2 (J · KJEMAIL is secure). ∀C1, C2.C1≃ctx C2 ⇒ JC1KJEMAIL ≃ctx JC2KJEMAIL .
For Theorem 2 we proceed as follows. First, we devise a notion of trace
equivalence T= for securely-compiled components; this is a slight adaptation of a
similar trace semantics for the single-module version of AIL [36]. Intuitively the
trace semantics describes the behaviour of a set of modules with sets of traces,
i.e., concatenation of actions such as call and return. Most importantly, trace
semantics lets us disregard contexts when reasoning about modules behaviour.
We assume that T= is equivalent to ≃ctx , so the two notions can be exchanged.
Assumption 5 (Trace semantics coincides with contextual equivalence for se-
curely compiled JEM components). ∀C1, C2.JC1KJEMAIL ≃ctx JC2KJEMAIL ⇐⇒ JC1KJEMAIL T= JC2KJEMAIL .
Then we re-state Theorem 2 in contrapositive form:
∀C1, C2.JC1KJEMAIL T=/ JC2KJEMAIL ⇒ C1 6≃ctx C2
To achieve C1 6≃ctx C2 we need to show (by negating Definition 1) that there ex-
ist a context that, wlog, terminates with C1 and diverges with C2. This context
is said to differentiate between C1 and C2. For this, we devise an algorithm
〈〈·〉〉 that can always generate such a differentiating context given two JEM com-
ponents whose compiled counterparts are trace-inequivalent [17, 35, 36]. Since
〈〈·〉〉 is sketched to be correct (Theorem 3), we can use it to witness that two
JEM components are contextually-inequivalent if their compiled counterparts are
trace-inequivalent.
Theorem 3 (Algorithm correctness). ∀C1, C2, αα1 ∈ TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ), αα2 ∈
TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ), α1 6= α2, 〈〈C1, C2, αα1, αα2〉〉 = C such that C[C1]⇑ ⇐⇒/ C[C2]⇑.
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6.3 Full-Abstraction and Modularity
By the theorems of Sections 6.1 and 6.2, J · KJEMAIL is fully-abstract (Theorem 4).
Theorem 4 (J·KJEMAIL is fully-abstract). ∀C1, C2. C1≃ctx C2 ⇐⇒ JC1KJEMAIL ≃ctx JC2KJEMAIL .
The novel result we are after for J · KJEMAIL is modular full-abstraction, i.e.
components can be compiled separately and linked together afterwards without
compromising security. Indicate the linking of two AIL components P1 and P2 as
link(P1, P2). This definition is derived from Ahmed’s definition of horizontal
compiler compositionality [5]; it states that we can create source-level compo-
nents by joining an arbitrary number of them and by compiling them individu-
ally and then linking the result. Additionally, we prove this result for arbitrary
target-level components P and P ′ that are equivalent to securely-compiled ones.
P and P ′ can be seen as hand-optimised versions of C2 and C4 that respect the
behaviour imposed by J · KJEMAIL . Formally, we have that Corollary 1 is a corollary
of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1 (Modular full-abstraction). ∀C1, C2, C3, C4. ∀P .JC2KJEMAIL ≃ctx P , ∀P ′.JC4KJEMAIL ≃ctx P ′,
C1; C2≃ctx C3; C4 ⇐⇒ link(JC1KJEMAIL , P )≃ctx link(JC3KJEMAIL , P ′).
7 Related Work
Secure compilation through full-abstraction was pioneered by Abadi [1] and
successfully applied to many different settings [35, 20, 13, 7, 6, 4, 24, 18]. Parrow
proved which conditions must hold in source and target languages to provide a
fully-abstract compiler between the two [32]. Gorla and Nestmann concluded
that full-abstraction is meaningful when it entails properties like security [21].
A large body of research provided secure compilers for a variety of lan-
guages with different language features. Three works are closely related to the
present one. The first one is the fully-abstract compilation scheme of single-
module code to single-module PMA of Patrignani et al. [35], where linking is
not explicitly considered. The second one is the secure compiler targeting an
extension of the PUMP machine (a tag-based assembly-level architecture that
enforces micro-policies with each instruction) [9] by Juglaret and Hritcu [26].
This work considers a very similar source language, so it incurs in very similar
problems to what discussed here. Intuitively, Juglaret and Hritcu use tags to
create PMA-like modules (with their local stacks) where jumps can only be done
at specific addresses. By relying on a very different architecture, their solution
differs significantly from ours. For example, to address Problem 2, they rely on
linear tags for return addresses. Their tags also capture type information, so
that dynamic typechecks (as needed for Problem 3) are made based on tags.
As stated in Section 1, the main difference between the two works is in the
architecture they target: while SGX-like PMA is readily available, it may be a
while before PUMP-like machine hit the market. The third closest secure com-
pilation result is the (probabilistic) fully-abstract compiler to ASLR-enhanced
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target languages, which also does not explicitly consider linking [4, 24]. ASLR
prevents some linking problems (e.g., object guessing) but not all of them (e.g.,
call stack shortcutting). We expect that ASLR-based secure compilation can
be made resilient to all linking related attacks by adopting analogous counter-
measures to those described in this paper.
Most secure compilation works adopt the fully-abstract compilation notion
of Abadi [1]. These works achieve security by relying on type systems for the
target language [7, 6, 20], cryptographical primitives [14, 15, 2] and the already
mentioned ASLR [4, 24] and PMA [35]. Additionally, certain works provide
secure compilers by means of type-preserving compilers [11, 10, 41], though
they require the target language to be well-typed. Of all these works, only
Abadi et al. [2] consider multiple modules, but in a distributed setting rather
than on a single machine, so that presents different vulnerabilities than the ones
considered in this paper.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presented a secure compilation scheme from JEM, an object-based
imperative language to AIL, an untyped assembly language enhanced with PMA.
Because AIL explicitly deals with linking, the secure compiler developed in this
paper faces a number of threats that no previous work considers. This pa-
per formalised the compiler J · KJEMAIL and explaind how it withstands these new
threats. Finally, it presented how J · KJEMAIL is fully-abstract and modular, so that
the additional threats arising from linking cannot be exploited by a malicious
attacker.
The authors foresee a number of future research trajectories for this work:
integrating a garbage collector with securely compiled programs, supporting
secure compilation for concurrent programs and developing secure compilation
schemes for emerging security architectures such as capability machines [43, 42].
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank Amal Ahmed, Ca˘ta˘lin
Hrit¸cu, Yannis Juglaret, Raoul Strackx and the anonymous reviewers for useful com-
ments on an earlier version of this paper. This work has been supported in part by
the Intel Labs University Research Office. This research is also partially funded by the
Research Fund KU Leuven, and by the EU FP7 project NESSoS. With the financial
support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European
Union (B-CCENTRE).
27
Appendix Introduction
The appendix contains formalisation of the JEM (Appendix A) and AIL (Ap-
pendix B) languages, the formalisation of the algorithm 〈〈·〉〉 (Appendix C) and
proofs and proof sketches of the paper (Appendix D).
A JEM
The formalisation of JEM borrows extensively from that of Java Jr. [25] and from
the single-component version of it [35, 34].
A.1 Static Semantics
A rule of the form P ⊢ E is intended to be P ⊢ E1, · · · ,P ⊢ En where E =
E1, · · · , En. Denote a stack of variable bindings with S ::= x : t
(Type-programs)
P = C1, · · · , Cn, ∀i ∈ 1..n P ⊢ Ci
Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O P ⊢ I P ⊢ X
⊢ P : prg
(Interface-checking)
P = C1, · · · , Cn, ∃i ∈ 1..n.
Ci = import I;X ; class c{K Ft MM ′};O
Mt =Mt1, · · · ,Mtm M =M1, · · · ,Mm
∀j ∈ 1..m. Mj ⊢Mtj c is unique in P
P ⊢ class-decl c{Mt}
(Method-checking)
M = public m(x) :Mt {return E; } Mt = m : t(t)→ t′
M ⊢Mt
(Extern-checking)
P ⊢ o : c
P ⊢ obj-decl o : c
(Type-class)
P ⊢ I P ⊢ X P , c, Ft ⊢ K
P ; c ⊢M P, c, Ft, O ⊢ O c is unique in P
P ⊢ import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
(Type-object)
o is unique in P Ft = f1 : t1, · · · , fn : tn,
F = private f1 = v1, · · · , private fn = vn
∀i ∈ 1..n. P ⊢ vi : ti
P , c, Ft, O ⊢ object o : c{F}
(Type-unit)
P ⊢ unit : Unit
(Type-bool)
v ≡ true∨ v ≡ false
P ⊢ v : Bool
(Type-int)
v ∈ N
P ⊢ v : Int
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(Type-obj)
P ⊢ t P = C1, · · · , Cn, ∃i ∈ 1..n.
Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
O = O1, · · · , Om, ∃j ∈ 1..m. Oj = object o : c{F}
P ⊢ v : t
(Type-constructor)
Ft = f1 : t1, · · · , fn : tn f = f1, · · · , fn t = t1, · · · , tn
P, c, Ft ⊢ c(f : t) {this.f ′ = f}
(Type-method)
x = x1, · · · , xn Mt = m : t(t)→ t′ t = t1, · · · , tn
P ;x1 : t1, · · · , xn : tn; c ⊢ E : t′;S′ m is unique in P
∀i ∈ 1..n xi is unique in x
P; c ⊢ public m(x) :Mt {return E; }
(Type-expr-var)
x : t ∈ S
P ;S; c ⊢ x : t; ∅
(Type-expr-field)
P ;S; c ⊢ E : c; ∅ P = C1, · · · , Cn, ∃i ∈ 1..n.
Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O f : t ∈ Ft
P ;S; c ⊢ E.f : t; ∅
(Type-expr-field-update)
P;S; c ⊢ E : c; ∅ P ;S; c ⊢ E′ : t; ∅ P = C1, · · · , Cn,
∃i ∈ 1..n. Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O f : t ∈ Ft
P ;S; c ⊢ E.f = E′ : Unit; ∅
(Type-expr-method)
P ;S; c ⊢ E : t; ∅ P ;S; c ⊢ E : t; ∅ P = C1, · · · , Cn,
∃i ∈ 1..n. Ci = import I;X; class c′{K Ft M};O
M =M1, · · · ,Mm
∃i ∈ 1..m. Mm = public m(x) :Mt {return E′′; }
Mt = m : t(t)→ t′
P;S; c ⊢ E.m(E) : t′; ∅
(Type-expr-op)
P ;S; c ⊢ E : t; ∅ P ;S; c ⊢ E′ : t′; ∅ op : t× t′ → t′′
P ;S; c ⊢ E op E′ : t′′; ∅
(Type-expr-exit)
P;S; c ⊢ E : t; ∅
P;S; c ⊢ exit E : t; ∅
(Type-expr-sequence)
P ;S; c ⊢ E : t;S′ P;S, S′; c ⊢ E;E′ : t′;S′′
P;S; c ⊢ E;E′ : t′;S′, S′′
(Type-expr-newvar)
x /∈ dom(S) P;S; c, x : t; c ⊢ E : t; ∅
P ;S; c ⊢ var x : t = E : Unit;x : t
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(Type-expr-if)
P;S; c ⊢ E : Bool; ∅ P ;S; c ⊢ E′ : t; ∅ P ;S; c ⊢ E′′ : t; ∅
P ;S; c ⊢ if (E) {E′} else {E′′} : t; ∅
(Type-expr-new)
P;S; c ⊢ E : t; ∅ P = C1, · · · , Cn, ∃i ∈ 1..n.
Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O K = c(f : t) {this.f ′ = f}
P;S; c ⊢ new c(X) : c; ∅
(Type-expr-val)
∃t. P ;S; c ⊢ v : t
P ;S; c ⊢ v
(Type-expr-this)
P ;S; c ⊢ this : c
Contexts for the evalutation of expressions are defined as follows: E ::=
E ::= [·] | E.m(X) | o.m(v,E, E) | E.f | E.f = E | v.f = E | new c(v,E, X) |
if(E){E}else{E} | E;E | var x : t = E | return E | E op E | v op E |
exit E | instanceof(E, c).
Configurations for the dynamic semantics: k ::= (P ;B ⊢ E[E]).
B is a stack of stacks B ::= x 7→ v, lookup and update is always done to the
top stack of the stack.
Transitions of the static semantics →⊆ k × k.
Initial state for a program P = P; ∅ ⊢ [main.main()].
Define plugging for contextual equivalence as follows: if C = C, then C[C′] =
C, C′ if C⌢ C′. The initial state of C[C′] is C, C′; ∅ ⊢ [main.main()]. Assume a
context always define the main method and the main class.
(JEM-eval-field-lookup)
P = C1, · · · , Cn, ∃i ∈ 1..n. Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
O = O1, · · · , Om, ∃j ∈ 1..m. Oj = object o : c{F} private f = v ∈ F
P ;B ⊢ E[o.f ]→ P ;B ⊢ E[v]
(JEM-eval-field-update)
P = C1, · · · , Cn ∃i ∈ 1..n.
Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
O = O1, · · · , Om ∃j ∈ 1..m.
Oj = object o : c{F} F = F1, · · · , Fl
∃h ∈ 1..l. Fh = private f = v′ F ′h = private f = v
F ′ = F1, · · · , Fh−1, F ′h, Fh+1, · · · , Fl O′j = object o : c{F ′}
O′ = O1, · · · , Oj−1, O′j , Oj+1, · · · , Om
C′i = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O′
P ′ = C1, · · · , Ci−1, C′i, Ci+1, · · · , Cn
P ;B ⊢ E[o.f = v]→ P ′;B ⊢ E[unit]
(JEM-eval-method-call)
P = C1, · · · , Cn ∃i ∈ 1..n. Ci = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
O = O1, · · · , Om ∃j ∈ 1..m. Oj = object o : c{F}
M =M1, · · · ,Mk ∃h ∈ 1..k. Mk = public m(x) :Mt {return E; }
P;B ⊢ E[o.m(v)]→ P; ∅;B ⊢ E[E[o/this][v/x]]
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(JEM-eval-method-return)
P;B;B ⊢ E[return v]→ P ;B ⊢ E[v]
(JEM-eval-new)
P = C1, · · · , Cn ∃i ∈ 1..n. Ci = import I;X ; class c{K Ft M};O
O = O1, · · · , Om Ft = f : t O = object o : c{f = v} o is fresh in P
O
′
= O1, · · · , Om, O C′i = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
′
P ′ = C1, · · · , Ci−1, C′i, Ci+1, · · · , Cn
P;B ⊢ E[new c(v)]→ P ′;B ⊢ E[o]
(JEM-eval-if-true)
P ;B ⊢ E[if (true) {Et} else {Ef}]→ P ;B ⊢ E[Et]
(JEM-eval-if-false)
P ;B ⊢ E[if (false) {Et} else {Ef}]→ P ;B ⊢ E[Et]
(JEM-eval-instanceof-true)
∃C ∈ P . C = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
∃O ∈ O. O = object v : c{F}
P;B ⊢ E[instanceof(v : c)]→ P;B ⊢ E[true]
(JEM-eval-instanceof-false)
∄C ∈ P . C = import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O
∃O ∈ O. O = object v : c{F}
P ;B ⊢ E[instanceof(v : c)]→ P;B ⊢ E[false]
(JEM-eval-local-var)
P ;B ⊢ E[var x : t = v]→ P ;B + (x 7→ v) ⊢ E[v]
(JEM-eval-lookup-var)
B(x) = v
P;B ⊢ E[x]→ P ;B ⊢ E[v]
(JEM-eval-op)
v op v′ = v′′
P ;B ⊢ E[v op v′]→ P ;B ⊢ E[v′′]
(JEM-eval-exit)
P;B ⊢ E[exit v]→ P ;B ⊢ v
(JEM-eval-concatenation)
P ;B ⊢ E[v;E]→ P ;B ⊢ E[E]
Define compatibility as follows:
(Component satisfaction)
C  C′ C′  C
C⌢ C′
Define a component to satisfy another as C′  C. Formally:
(Component satisfaction base)
C′  ∅
(Component satisfaction inductive)
C′  C1 C′  C
C′  C1; C
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(Component satisfaction single)
C = C1, · · · , Cn C = import I;X ; class c{K Ft M};O
I = I1, · · · , Im X = X1, · · · , Xk
∀i ∈ 1..m, ∃j ∈ 1..n. Ii = class-decl i{Mt}
Cj = import I
′
;X
′
; class i{K ′ Ft′ M ′};O′ M ′ ⊢Mt
∀g ∈ 1..k, ∃h ∈ 1..n. Xg = obj-decl o : c;
Ch = import I
′′
;X
′′
; class c{K ′′ Ft′′ M ′′};O′′ O′′ = O′′1 , · · · , O′′l
∃h ∈ 1..l. O′′h = object o : c{F}
C  C
A component satisfies a class if all import declarations in the class are imple-
mented in the component. So, for all interfaces imported in the class, a class
exists in the component with the same name and at least the same required
methods. For all externs imported, an object exists with the same name and
the same type.
B AIL, Formally
The formalisation of AIL borrows extensively from that of the single-module
version by Patrignani and Clarke [36].
Define (P1)⌢(P2) as follows.
(program compatibility)
t1 = EM1;EO1;RM1;RO1 t2 = EM2;EO2;RM2;RO2
EM1  RM2 EM2  RM1 EO1  RO2 EO2  RO1
(m1, s1, t1)⌢(m2, s2, t2)
(Exported satisfy required -meth- ind)
∀i ∈ 1..n EM  RM i
EM  RM1, · · · , RMn
(Exported satisfy required -meth- base)
∃a. m :Mt 7→ a ∈ EM
EM  m :Mt 7→ ι;σ
(Exported satisfy required -obj- ind)
∀i ∈ 1..n EO  ROi
EO  RO1, · · · , ROn
(Exported satisfy required -obj- base)
∃n. o : c 7→ n ∈ EO
EO  o : c 7→ σ
Define a substitution of a symbol σ for a word w as η = [w/σ].
Define P1 + P2 as follows.
(program merging)
m1⌢m2 s1⌢s2 t1 + t2 = t; η m = (m1 +m2)η
(m1, s1, t1)+(m2, s2, t2) = (m, s1s2, t)
(mem - compat)
dom(m1) ∩ dom(m2) = ∅
m1⌢m2
(desc - compat - ind)
∀i ∈ 1..n s⌢si
s⌢s1, · · · , sn
(desc - compat - base)
s = s1, · · · , sn ∀i ∈ 1..n. si ≡ (idi, nci, ni) idi 6= id
s⌢(id, nc, n)
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(mem sub - ind)
m = a1 7→ w1η, · · · , an 7→ wnη
a1 7→ w1, · · · , an 7→ wnη = m
(sub-s-ind)
∀i ∈ 1..n w′i = w′i−1[wi/σi]
w[w1/σ1], · · · , [wn/σn] = w′n
(sub-s-n)
n[w/σ] = n
(sub-s-p)
π[w/σ] = π
(sub-s)
σ′ = σ
σ′[w/σ] = w
(sub-s-no)
σ′ 6= σ
σ′[w/σ] = σ′
(mem add)
m1⌢m2
m1 +m2 = m1m2
(linking tables merging)
EM1;EO1;RM1;RO1⌢EM2;EO2;RM2;RO2
EM = EM1EM2 EO = EO1EO2 t = EM ;EO;
RM1 + EM2 = RM
′
+ η′ RM2 + EM1 = RM
′′
+ η′′
RO1 + EO2 = RO
′
+ η′′′ RO2 + EO1 = RO
′′
+ η′′′′
RM = RM
′
RM
′′
RO = RO
′
RO
′′
η = η′η′′η′′′η′′′′
EM1;EO1;RM1;RO1 + EM2;EO2;RM2;RO2 = t; η
(rm - merged - em - ind)
RM = RM1, · · · , RMn ∀i ∈ 1..n RMi + EM = RM ′i + η′iη′′i
RM
′
= RM ′1, · · · , RM ′n η′ = η′1η′′1 , · · · , η′nη′′n
RM + EM = RM
′
+ η′
(rm - merged - em - base)
m :Mt 7→ (id, n) ∈ EM
m :Mt 7→ ι;σ + EM = ∅+ [n/σ][id/ι]
(rm - merged - em - base2)
m :Mt /∈ dom(EM)
m :Mt 7→ ι;σ + EM = m : Mt 7→ ι;σ + ∅∅
(ro - merged - eo - ind)
RO = RO1, · · · , ROn ∀i ∈ 1..n ROi + EO = RO′i + η′i
RO
′
= RO′1, · · · , RO′n η′ = η′1, · · · , η′n
RO + EO = RO
′
+ η′
(ro - merged - eo - base)
m :Mt 7→ n ∈ EM
m :Mt 7→ σ + EM = ∅+ [n/σ]
(ro - merged - eo - base2)
m :Mt /∈ dom(EM)
m :Mt 7→ σ + EM = m : Mt 7→ σ + ∅
These rules extend the single-module PMA access control policy to account
for multiple modules. Assume s = (id, nc, nt).
(Aux-unprotected)
a = (0, n)
s ⊢ unprotected(a)
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(Aux-entrypoint)
a = (id, n′) n′ = nb +m · Nw m ∈ N m < nt
s ⊢ entryPoint(a)
(Aux-methodEntryPoint)
a = (id, n′) n′ = nb +m · Nw n′ = nb + (m) · Nw m ∈ 1..nt − 1
s ⊢ entryPoint(a)
(Aux-returnEntryPoint)
a = (id, n′) n′ = nb + (nt − 1) · Nw
s ⊢ returnEntryPoint(a)
(Aux-code)
a = (id, n′) nb ≤ n′ < nb + nc
s ⊢ codeRange(a)
(Aux-data)
a = (id, n′) nb + nc ≤ n′
s ⊢ dataRange(a)
(Aux-range)
a = (id, n′) n′ ∈ N
s ⊢ range(a)
(Aux-internalJump-module)
s ⊢ codeRange((id, n), (id, n′))
s ⊢ internalJump((id, n), (id, n′))
(Aux-writeAllowed-module)
s ⊢ codeRange(a) s ⊢ dataRange(a′)
s ⊢ writeAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-readAllowed-module)
s ⊢ codeRange(a) s ⊢ range(a′)
s ⊢ readAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-crossjump)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ range(a) ∃s′ ∈ s.s′ ⊢ entryPoint(a′) s 6= s′
s ⊢ crossJump(a, a′)
(Aux-internalJump)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ internalJump(a, a′)
s ⊢ internalJump(a, a′)
(Aux-internalJump2)
s ⊢ unprotected(a) s ⊢ unprotected(a′)
s ⊢ internalJump(a, a′)
(Aux-validJump)
s ⊢ internalJump(a, a′)
s ⊢ validJump(a, a′)
(Aux-validJump2)
s ⊢ crossJump(a, a′)
s ⊢ validJump(a, a′)
(Aux-validJump3)
s ⊢ unprotected(a) s ⊢ entryPoint(a′)
s ⊢ validJump(a, a′)
(Aux-validJump4)
s ⊢ protected(a) s ⊢ unprotected(a′)
s ⊢ validJump(a, a′)
(Aux-writeAllowed)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ writeAllowed(a, a′)
s ⊢ writeAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-writeAllowed2)
s ⊢ unprotected(a) s ⊢ unprotected(a′)
s ⊢ writeAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-writeAllowed3)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ range(a) s ⊢ unprotected(a′)
s ⊢ writeAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-readAllowed)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ readAllowed(a, a′)
s ⊢ readAllowed(a, a′)
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(Aux-readAllowed2)
s ⊢ unprotected(a) s ⊢ unprotected(a′)
s ⊢ readAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-readAllowed3)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ range(a) s ⊢ unprotected(a′)
s ⊢ readAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-readAllowed4)
s ⊢ unprotected(a) ∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ entryPoint(a′)
s ⊢ readAllowed(a, a′)
(Aux-methodEntryPoint)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ methodEntryPoint(a′)
s ⊢ methodEntryPoint(a)
(Aux-entryPoint)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ entryPoint(a′)
s ⊢ entryPoint(a)
(Aux-returnEntryPoint)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ returnEntryPoint(a′)
s ⊢ returnEntryPoint(a)
(Aux-protected)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ range(a′)
s ⊢ protected(a)
(Aux-currentModule)
s ∈ s s = id, nc, nt s ⊢ range(id, n)
(id, n) ⊢ currentModule(s, s)
(Aux-exitJump)
∃s ∈ s.s ⊢ codeRange(a) t = EM ;EO;RM ;RO m : t(t)→ t 7→ w,w′ ∈ RM
s, t ⊢ exitJump(a,w,w′)
(Aux-stuck)
m(p) = w w /∈ I
⊢ stuck(p′, r′, f ′, m′, s, h))
(Aux-validJump-traces)
s ⊢ validJump(p, a)
s, t ⊢ validJump(p, a)
(Aux-validJump-traces2)
s, t ⊢ exitJump(p, a)
s, t ⊢ validJump(p, a)
(Aux-forwardReturn-EP)
p ≡ (1, 3 ∗ Nw)
s, t ⊢ forwardReturnEP(p)
An exit jump is only used for the trace semantics, so where states span just
some modules and the descriptors describe just their layout. An exit jump is
therefore a jump to an address that is not in the domain covered by the modules.
This could be completely another module or the unprotected code.
The rules presented in the paper extend the operational semantics of AIL.
Define a module state as follows: Υ ::= (p, r, f,m, s, h) and a program state as
follows: Ω ::= (p, r, f ,m, s, h). Let Π denote the set of all symbolic nonces π.
Let ≡ denote syntactic equivalence; equating a number and a symbol therefore
results in false.
(Eval-module-common)
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ (p′, r′, f ′,m′, s, h′)
s = (id, nc, nt) p = (id, n) s ⊢ internalJump(p, p′)
(p, r, f,m, s, h)
id−−→→ (p′, r′, f ′,m′, s, h′)
(Eval-movi)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (movi rd i) r
′ = r[rd 7→ i]
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ,m, s, h)
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(Eval-add)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (add rd rs)
vd = r(rd), if r(rd) ∈ Π then vd = 0
vs = r(rs), if r(rs) ∈ Π then vs = 0
v = vd + vs r
′ = r[rd 7→ v] f ′ = f [ZF 7→ (v == 0)]
(p, r, f,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ′,m, s, h)
(Eval-sub)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (sub rd rs) vd = r(rd), if r(rd) ∈ Π then vd = 0
vs = r(rs), if r(rs) ∈ Π then vs = 0 v = vd − vs r′ = r[rd 7→ abs(v)]
f ′ = f [ZF 7→ (v == 0); SF 7→ (v < 0)]
(p, r, f,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ′,m, s, h)
(Eval-cmp)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (cmp rd rs) f
′ = f [ZF 7→ (r(rd) ≡ r(rs))]
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r, f ′,m, s, h)
(Eval-je-true)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (je rd fi) n
′ = r(rd) f(fi) = 1
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n′), r, f,m, s, h)
(Eval-je-false)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (je rd fi) f(fi) = 0
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r, f ,m, s, h)
(Eval-new)
p = (id, n) m(p) = new rd r
′ = r[rd 7→ pi] pi /∈ h
(p, r, f,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ,m, s, h;pi)
(Eval-zero)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (zero) ∀i ∈ N r′ = r[ri 7→ 0]
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ,m, s, h)
(Eval-halt)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (halt)
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ ((0,−1), r, f ,m, s, h)
(Eval-single-to-multiple-modules)
(p, r, f ,m, s, h)
id−−→ (p′, r′, f ′,m′, s, h′) p ⊢ currentModule(s, s) p = (id, n)
(p, r, f,m, s, h) →→ (p′, r′, f ′,m′, s, h′)
(Eval-movl)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (movl rd rs ri)
s ⊢ readAllowed(n, (r(rs), r(ri))) r′ = r[rd 7→ m(r(rs), r(ri))]
(p, r, f,m, s, h) →→ ((id, n+ 1), r′, f ,m, s, h)
(Eval-movs)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (movs rd rs ri)
s ⊢ writeAllowed(n, (r(rd), r(ri))) m′ = m[(r(rd), r(ri)) 7→ r(rs)]
(p, r, f,m, s, h) →→ ((id, n+ 1), r, f,m′, s, h)
(Eval-jmp)
p = (id, n) m(p) = (jmp rd ri) n
′ = r(rd) id
′ = r(ri) r
′ = r[r0 7→ id]
s ⊢ validJump(p, (id′, n′))
(p, r, f,m, s, h)→→ ((id′, n′), r′, f ,m, s, h)
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B.0.1 Trace Equivalence for Securely-Compiled Components in AIL
This section defines a trace equivalence to reason about securely-compiled com-
ponents in AIL; it is inspired by the trace semantics for the single-module version
of AIL [36].
Trace equivalence is a simpler tool to reason about equivalence of components
than contextual equivalence [36, 35, 4, 24, 25]. Trace equivalence relates two
components that exhibit the same trace semantics. Trace semantics describes
the behaviour of a component as a set of traces. Traces are sequences of actions
α with the following syntax:
labels λ ::= α | τ actions α ::= γ! | γ? | √
observables γ ::= call a w | ret a w, id
Labels λ generated by the trace semantics can be actions α or the silent action τ .
The silent action τ is generated by unobservable transitions, thus these labels are
not accumulated in traces. Actions α can be an observable, decorated action γ
or a tick
√
, which indicates termination of the computation. Observable actions
γ are either a function call to an address a with parameters w, or a return of
value w to address a from the module with id id. Decorations ? or ! indicate
whether unprotected code performs the action (?) or receives it (!).
Define a (compiled) component state with Θ, it indicates either that the
execution is within a component or that the execution is in an unknown lo-
cation. Formally: Θ ::= (p, r, f,m, s, h, t) | (unk,m, s, h, t). Θ0(P , h) denotes
the initial state of a component P = (m, s, t) with a nonce oracle h. Formally:
Θ0(P , h) = (unk,m, s, h, t). Relation
λ−−→→ ⊆ Θ × λ × Θ captures how single
labels are generated. The reflexive-transitive closure of
λ−−→→ accumulates labels
in traces and filters out silent traces; it is captured by relation
α
==⇒⇒⊆ Θ×α×Θ.
The auxiliary functions adopted for the trace semantics are used to tell if an
address is an entry point (methodEntryPoint), or if it is the entry point related
to the forwardReturn( · ) procedure in JSysKJEMAIL (forwardReturnEP). Function
exitJump detects jumps outside the memory space of a component; function
stuck tells if a state is stuck.
Define the trace semantics of a component P as: TracesAIL(P ) = {α | ∀h.∃Θ.
Θ0(P , h)
α
==⇒⇒ Θ}. Two modules P1 and P2 are trace equivalent, denoted with
P1 T=P2 if their trace semantics coincides.
Definition 4 (Trace equivalence). P1 T=P2 , TracesAIL(P1) = TracesAIL(P2).
For securely-compiled components, trace semantics coincides with contextual
equivalence (Assumption 5).
Proof Sketch. This proof is analogous to the one for the single-module version of
AIL [36], we just give an informal argument why it holds, though the proof of [36]
can be easily adapted to scale for AIL. Informally, we need to prove that labels
capture all the information that is communicated between a securely-compiled
component and external code.
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(Trace-call)
w = w0, · · · , w6+k r = [r0 7→ w0, · · · , r6+k 7→ w6+k]
s ⊢ methodEntryPoint(p) m : t(t1 · · · , tk)→ t 7→ p ∈ EM
t = EM ;EO;RM ;RO
(unk,m, s, h, t)
call p w?−−−−−−−→→ (p, r, f,m, s, h, t)
(Trace-outcall)
m(p) = (jmp rd ri) p
′ = (ι, σ) r(rd) 7→ σ r(ri) 7→ ι
w = w0, · · · , w6+k r = [r0 7→ w0, · · · , r6+k 7→ w6+k]
s, t ⊢ exitJump(p, p′) r(r5) = 3 ∗ Nw
m : t(t1 · · · , tk)→ t 7→ ι;σ ∈ RM t = EM ;EO;RM ;RO
(p, r, f,m, s, h, t)
call p′ w!−−−−−−−−→→ (unk,m, s, h, t)
(Trace-returnback)
r = [r0 7→ id′, r6 7→ w] s ⊢ forwardReturnEP(p)
(unk,m, s, h, t)
ret p w,id′?−−−−−−−−−→→ (p, r, f ,m, s, h, t)
(Eval-return)
m(p) = (jmp rd ri) p = (id, n) p
′ = (id′, n′)
r(rd) 7→ n′ r(ri) 7→ id′ r = [r6 7→ w]
s, t ⊢ exitJump(p, p′) r(r5) 7→ 0
(p, r, f,m, s, h, t)
ret p′ w,id!−−−−−−−−−→ (unk,m, s, h, t)
(Trace-tau)
Θ→→ Θ′
Θ
τ−−→→ Θ′
(Trace-refl)
Θ
ǫ
=⇒⇒ Θ
(Trace-tau)
Θ
τ−−→→ Θ′
Θ
ǫ
=⇒ Θ′
(Trace-trans)
Θ
α−−→ Θ′′
Θ′′
α′
==⇒⇒ Θ′
Θ
α·α′
====⇒ Θ′
(Trace-termination)
Θ→→ Θ′
⊢ stuck(Θ′)
Θ
√
−−→ Θ′
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!-decorated actions . The ret · · · ! action has a standard structure for when
it is valid: ret a w, 1!, where a has been received on r0 and r5 beforehand
by JSysKJEMAIL .
Also call · · · ! has a standard structure: call id, n (1, n, 0, 0, 0, 3∗Nw, w)!,
where id, n is in the export tables of the modules.
Assumption 4 about (|·|) code ensures that all communication coming from
a compiled component happen only via entry points.
Specifically, this communication is regulated by the code added via the
protect( · ) function.
In case of a call · ! only the registers used to carry a parameter (including
the current object) are passed because resetFlags( · ), resetRegisters( · )
and resetRegistersExcept( · ) ensure that other registers are always 0.
In case of a ret ·! resetFlags( · ), resetRegisters( · ) and resetRegistersExcept( · )
ensure that only the module id and the returned value (in r6) are not al-
ways 0.
Some of the data communicated via registers could be omitted since, as
stated, it is always the same so it conveys no information. We keep this
data as we chose for the same structure of labels for incoming and outgoing
actions.
?-decorated actions . Nor the code inserted by protect( · ) nor the one
generated by (| · |) uses flags as set by external code, so flags are never used
to convey information.
In case of a call ·?, due to the assumption on the correctness of (|·|) and on
the definition of protect( · ) only the registers used to carry parameters
are used for computation.
In case of a ret · ?, the only registers used for calculation by protect( · )
are r0 and r6, which are the only ones captured by the trace semantics.
✷
C Algorithm Formalisation
C.1 Trace Back-Translation Algorithm 〈〈·〉〉
Informally, the algorithm is used to build a JEM context that can distinguish
two JEM components whose compiled counterparts are trace inequivalent.
The algorithm inputs two distinct AIL traces α1 and α2 and the two JEM com-
ponents that generate them C1 and C2. In other words α1 ∈ TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL )
and α2 ∈ TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ). The algorithm outputs a single JEM component
C that is the context that can differentiate between C1 and C2. Formally:
〈〈C1, C2, α1, α2〉〉 = C. The two traces are the same up to the last action, there-
fore α1 ≡ αα1! and α2 ≡ αα2! where α1! 6= α2!. Trace α is called the common
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prefix while the two actions α1! and α2! are the different actions, which appear
at index i.
Intuitively, the algorithm produces code C that replicates all ?-decorated
actions in the common prefix α. The !-decorated actions are made by the
component that fills the hole of C and the algorithm adds code to C to update
its internal state. Then, C performs the differentiation by terminating in case
it detects C1 and diverging in the other.
The algorithm is divided in three sub-routines: building the skeleton (skeleton(C1, C2)),
emulating the common prefix (emulate(α, t)) and distinguishing the different
actions (diff(α1!, α2!, i)).
skeleton(C1, C2) implements all classes and objects that C1 and C2 specify in
their import declarations. Additionally, it creates helper functions and objects,
e.g., it has tables where all globally-known objects are stored and it has a
variable to keep track of the action being emulated.
emulate(α, t) returns method bodies that fill the classes created by skeleton( · )
based on the different encountered actions. Intuitively, this algorithm subrou-
tine creates a JEM context that emulates all ?-actions in the traces.
• call a w? In this case the context must call methodm compiled at address
a; t tells which AIL addresses correspond to which JEM methods. Based on
the (known) signature of m, the parameters w are emulated to their JEM
counterpart.
Primitively-typed parameters are emulated to their JEM counterpart. For
example when a Bool is expected and (|true|) is received, the parameter
is emulated by true. Object-typed parameters are stored in globally-
accessible tables based on the encoding of their type and of the id they
have in AIL. These tables have getters and setters to retrieve objects based
on their AIL id.
• ret a w? In this case the produced code must return the value emulating
w, as discussed in the call case.
• call a w! and ret a w! In these cases, the internal state of C is updated.
For example, C keeps track of the index of the action that is emulating
and of all allocated objects. In these cases, the index is incremented by
1 and all newly allocated objects received via w or w are added to the
tables.
There are cases in which a ?-decorated action cannot be emulated, e.g., a
return when no method call was made or a call to a method that expects a
Unit-typed parameter and instead receives (|true|). These are actions that try
to violate JEM abstractions; in this cases the algorithm must fail and generate
a differentiating component that does nothing (Lemma 1).
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Lemma 1 (Termination is emulation failure). ∀C, (|C|) = (mc,md, t).α√ ∈
TracesAIL(JCKJEMAIL ) ⇐⇒ emulate(α, t) = fail .
Lemma 1 is the most important result of this paper, as proving it reveals
which issues arise in a secure compiler. This Lemma states that any traces
that causes a termination tick cannot be replicated at the source level (i.e., the
algorithm fail s). An action that cannot be replicated in JEM is an action that
tries to violate the abstractions of JEM. Termination ticks are only generated by
the execution of halt; only the checks inserted by protect( · ) or by JSysKJEMAIL
insert that instruction. Traces with a
√
are traces that trigger a check; so they
are violating a JEM abstraction in compiled code. If this is true for all traces
with a
√
(the ⇒ direction), and also all traces that incur violations generate a√
(the ⇐ direction) then the algorithm is correct. Most importantly, this proof
indicates where to place the checks at entry points and what to check. The
fact that it is not possible to emulate something (e.g., a Bool-typed parameter
that is not (|true|) nor (|false|)) indicates what checks to add (in this case,
that Bool-typed parameters must be either (|true|) or (|false|), i.e., function
dynamicTypechecks( · )).
diff(α1!, α2!, i) returns two different code fragments that will detect whether
the produced context is interacting with C1 or C2. For example, consider the
two actions to be ret a (|true|)! and ret a (|false|)!. After the last emulated
action, the context needs to check the returned value and terminate in case it
is true and diverge in the other.
All cases when two !-decorated actions are different are considered in diff( · );
they are omitted for space reasons.
C.2 The Algorithm, Formally 〈〈·〉〉
skeleton(C1, C2) returns a component C.
emulate(α, t) returns a list of expressions bound to the method where they
must be added.
diff(α1, α2, i,M, V,m, t) returns a pair of expressions bound to the methods
where they must be added.
Define code additions A as follows: A ::= E@m | E@m@i.
C + E@m returns a new component where the body of method m has been
extended with E.
C+E@m@i is analogous but the extension E is placed in the body of method
m inside an if statement whose guard is oc.isStep( i ). The necessity of this
will be clear after having seen the rest of the functions.
The algorithm can be defined as follows:
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(〈〈·〉〉)
JC1KJEMAIL = (m1, s, t) JC2KJEMAIL = (m2, s, t)
skeleton(C1, C2) = C
emulate(α, t) = A,M, V,m, t, i
diff(α1, α2, i,M, V,m, t) = A1, A2
〈〈C1, C2, αα1, αα2〉〉 = C + A+ A1 + A2
C.3 skeleton(C1, C2)
(Collect Interfaces - base)
M = public m1(x1) : Mt1 {return E1; }, · · · , public mk(xk) :Mtk {return Ek; }
I = class-decl c{Mt1, · · · ,Mtk}
interfaces(import I;X; class c{K Ft M};O) = I
(Collect Interfaces - inductive)
∀i ∈ 1..k interfaces(Ci) = Ii
interfaces(C1, · · · , Ck) = I1, · · · , Ik
(Collect externs - base)
O = object o1 : c{F 1}, · · · , object ok : c{F k}
X
′
= obj-decl o1 : c, · · · , obj-decl ok : c;
externs(import I;X ; class c{K Ft M};O) = X ′
(Collect externs - inductive)
∀i ∈ 1..k externs(Ci) = Xi
externs(C1, · · · , Ck) = X1, · · · , Xk
(stub-class)
C = import I ;X; class i{K ∅ M};O;O K = i(∅) {}
staticFor(i) = O i 7→ O ∈ i 7→ O
Mt =Mt1, · · · ,Mtk ∀i ∈ 1..k. stub− method(Mti) =Mi
M =M1, · · · ,Mk
stub− class(class-decl i{Mt}, I;X, i 7→ O) = C
(stub-class inductive)
∀i ∈ 1..k stub− class(Ii) = Ci
stub− class(I1, · · · , Ik, I ;X, i 7→ O) = C1, · · · , Ck
(stub-obj)
object o : t{∅} = O
stub− obj(obj-decl o : t; ) = c 7→ O
(stub-obj ind)
∀i ∈ 1..k stub− obj(Xi) = ci 7→ Oi
stub− obj(X1, · · · , Xk) = c1 7→ O1 ⊎ · · · ⊎ ck 7→ Ok
(stub-method-unit)
M = public m(x) : t(t) → Unit {return unit; }
stub− method(m : t(t)→ Unit) =M
(stub-method-bool)
M = public m(x) : t(t) → Bool {return true; }
stub− method(m : t(t)→ Bool) =M
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(stub-method-int)
M = public m(x) : t(t) → Int {return 0; }
stub− method(m : t(t)→ Int) =M
(stub-method-obj)
M = public m(x) : t(t) → c {return null; }
stub− method(m : t(t)→ c) =M
(staticfor)
staticFor(i) = object static− for − i : i{∅}
(skel)
interfaces(C1, · · · , Ck) = I externs(C1, · · · , Ck) = E
∀i ∈ 1..k. Ci = import Ii;Xi; class ci{Ki Fti M i};Oi
I
′
= I1, · · · , Ik X ′ = X1, · · · , Xk helpers() = C
stub− obj(X ′) = c 7→ O stub− class(I ′, I,X, c 7→ O) = C
skeleton(C1, · · · , Ck, C′1, · · · , C′k) = C;C
(helpers)
C = import ∅; ∅; class Helper{K Ft M};O
helper− fieldtypes() = Ft
helper− objects() = O helper− methods() = M
helper − constructor() = K
helpers() = C
(helpers-fieldtypes)
Ft = step : Int
helper − fieldtypes() = Ft
(helpers-objects)
object oc : Helper{step = 0}
helper− objects() = O
(helpers-methods)
public isStep(x) :Mt {return if (this.step == x) {true} else {false}; }
Mt = isStep : Helper(Int)→ Bool
public incStep() : M ′t {return this.step + 1; unit; }
M ′t = incrStep : Helper()→ Unit
public diverge() : M ′′t {return this.diverge(); }
M ′′t = diverge : Helper()→ Unit
public main() : M ′′′t {return 0; }
M ′′′t = main : Helper()→ Int
helper− methods() =M
(helpers-constructor)
K = Helper(step : Int) {this.step = 0}
helper − constructor() = K
Note that the two components input by skeleton() must have the same imports
and they must define the same classes, otherwise they are trivial to differentiate.
Therefore, to build the skeleton in Rule skel we use only one component. Assume
the names Helper and oc are fresh (a simple substitution can ensure this).
For all class c and all interface i defined in C1 and C2, the Helper class also
contains a list. Call this class listof-t for a class or interface type t. Each
element of the list has a t field that points to an object of type t and an Int
field that contains the AIL encoding of object’s id. The list implements method
getByName( n ) that inputs a name n and returns the object with that name
in the list. Additionally, each list has an append method. Helper also has a
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method createNew-t( n ) that creates a new object of type t and adds it to
the list listof-t with name n; this method returns the new object. These lists
are populated with all known static objects (i.e., the objects declared in C1 and
C2).
Helper also has generic method addObject( o, n ) to insert object o with
name n will call instanceof(o, c) for all possible class and interface types
implemented by C1 and C2. Based on the type c, the method calls the append
on list listof-c.
Helper also has generic method getByName( n ) will call getByName( n )
on all lists until it finds the object to return.
C.4 emulate(α, t)
The emulate( · ) function fail s any time any of its sub-parts fail s. If this hap-
pens, it returns an empty method body for the main method.
Hoe to read the emulate( · ) judgment: emulate(α,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) =
E@m,V ′, id′, i′,m′, t′ under method environment M0, under knowledge of teh
allocated objects V , with the stack of caller ids id, with the stack of called methods
m and the stack of return types t, at step i, with bindings t, action α produces
code E to be placed inside method m, it updates the knowledge of objects with
V ′, it increments the step to i′, it updates the id stack to id′, it updates the
methods stack to m′ and the expected return types to t′.
The algorithm uses M to store method bindings, so M ::= a 7→ m :Mt and
V to store object bindings, so V ::= w : t.
(methodKnowledge)
M = a1 7→ m1 : Mt1, · · · , an 7→ mn : Mtn
methodKnowledge(m1 : Mt1 7→ a1, · · · , mn : Mtn 7→ an) =M
(objectsKnowledge)
V = w1 : t1, · · · , wn : tn
objectsKnowledge(o1 : t1 7→ w1, · · · , on : tn 7→ wn) = V
emulate( · ) uses a helper function nonce− to− int(t) hat translates nonces
to integers.
Following is the definition of emulate( · ).
(Emulate)
t = EM ;EO;RM ;RO methodKnowledge(EM,RM) =M0
objectsKnowledge(EO,RO) = V0 m0 = main
emulate(α1,M0, V0, ∅, m0, ∅, 0, t) = A1, V1, id1, i1,m1, t1
∀h ∈ 2..n, emulate(αh,M0, V0 + Vh−1, idh−1,mh−1, th−1, ih−1, t) = Ah, V ′h, idh, ih,mh, th
V ′ = V ′1 + · · ·+ V ′n
emulate(α1, · · ·αn, t) = A1; · · · ;An,M0, V ′,mn, tn, in−1
(Emulate- fail)
a fail happens
emulate(α1, · · ·αn) = ∅@main
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(Emulate - call)
a′ = (1, 2 ∗ Nw) a = r3, r4
M(a) = m : t(t1; · · · ; tm)→ t′ ∀i ∈ 1..m
E = if (oc.isStep( i )) then oc.incrStep(); + E1 + · · ·+ Em + E′
E′ = var o = Eo ;var retvar = o.m(arg-1, · · · , arg-m)
emulate(w6 : t, V ) = E
o; ∅ emulate(w6+i : ti, V ) = Evi , V ′i
Ei = var arg-i = E
v
i V
′ = V ′1 + · · ·+ V ′n
emulate(call a′ w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = E@m,V ′, w0id, i+ 1, mm, t′t
(Emulate - call - fail)
(w0, w5) is not an executable address in t
emulate(call a w1, · · · , vn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - call -fail2)
a′ = (1, 2 ∗ Nw) a = r3, r4 a /∈M
emulate(call a′ w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - callback)
M(a) = m : t(t1; · · · ; tm)→ t′ E = oc.incrStep(); + E1 + · · ·+ Em
V ′ = V ′1 + · · ·+ V ′m Let the name of the i-th parameter be xi
∀i ∈ 1..m.Ei, V ′i = possiblyAdd(w6+i, ti, xi)
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn!,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = E@m,V ′, w0id, i+ 1, mm, t′t
(possiblyAdd)
isInternal(t) w /∈ dom(V )
E = var arg-i = addObject( x, nonce− to− int(w)) V = w : t
possiblyAdd(w, t, x) = E, V
(Emulate - returnback)
E = if (oc.isStep( i ) ) then oc.incrStep(); var ret = Ev; return ret;
emulate(w : t, V ) = Ev, V ′ w′ = id a = (1, 3 ∗ Nw)
emulate(ret a w,w′?,M0, V, idid,mm, tt, i, t) = E@m,V
′, id, i+ 1, m, t
(Emulate - returnback - fail)
w′ 6= id a = (1, 3 ∗ Nw)
emulate(ret a w,w′?,M0, V, idid,mm, tt, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - returnback - fail2)
a 6= (1, 3 ∗ Nw)
emulate(ret a w,w′?,M0, V, id,m, tt, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - return)
isInternal(t) w /∈ dom(V ) V ′ = w : t
E = oc.incrStep(); var arg-r = addObject( retvar, nonce − to− int(w))
emulate(ret a w,w′!,M0, V, idid,mm, tt, i, t) = E@m,V
′, i+ 1, id,m, t
(Emulate - return2)
¬isInternal(t) E = oc.incrStep(); V ′ = ∅
emulate(ret a w, w′!,M0, V, idid,mm, tt, i, t) = E@m, V
′, i+ 1, id,m, t
(Emulate - addresses)
M(a) = m : Mt
emulate(a,M) = m : Mt
(Emulate - addresses - fail)
a /∈ dom(M)
emulate(a,M) = fail
(Emulate - values - unit)
t ≡ Unit w ≡ (|unit|) E = unit V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
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(Emulate - values - unit fail)
t ≡ Unit w 6≡ (|unit|)
emulate(w : t, V ) = fail
(Emulate - values - bool true)
t ≡ Bool w ≡ (|true|) E = true V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values - bool false)
t ≡ Bool w ≡ (|false|) E = false V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values- bool fail)
t ≡ Bool w 6≡ (|true|) w 6≡ (|false|)
emulate(w : t, V ) = fail
(Emulate - values - int)
t ≡ Int E = integerFor(w) V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values - null)
t <: Obj w ≡ (|null|) E = null V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values - external old)
t <: Obj isExternal(t) w ∈ V
E = oc.getByName( nonce− to− int(wi) ) V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values - external old - fail)
t <: Obj isExternal(t) w : t′ ∈ V t 6<: t′
emulate(w : t, V ) = fail
(Emulate - values - external new)
t <: Obj isExternal(t) n /∈ dom(V )
E = oc.createNew-t( n ); V ′ = n : t
emulate(n : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values - intern)
t <: Obj isInternal(t) w ∈ dom(V )
E = oc.getByName( nonce − to− int(w) ) V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - values - intern - fail)
t <: Obj isInternal(t) w /∈ V
emulate(w : t, V ) = fail
(Emulate - obj)
t ≡ Obj w ∈ dom(V ) E = oc.getByName( nonce− to− int(w) ) V ′ = ∅
emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - obj -ex)
t ≡ Obj n /∈ dom(V ) E = oc.createNew-t′( n ); V ′ = n : t′
If n is used again, let it be with type t′ 6= Obj otherwise let t′ be any external type
emulate(n : t, V ) = E, V ′
(Emulate - obj -ex fail)
t ≡ Obj pi /∈ dom(V )
emulate(pi : t, V ) = fail
(Emulate-type - unit)
w = (|Unit|)
emulate(w) = Unit
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(Emulate-type - bool)
w = (|Bool|)
emulate(w) = Bool
(Emulate-type - Int)
w = (|Int|)
emulate(w) = Int
(Emulate-type - class)
w = (|c|)
emulate(w) = c
(intfor - number)
integerFor(n) = n
(intfor - nonces)
integerFor(pi) = 0
(intfor -symbol)
integerFor(σ) = fail
(isinternal)
Type t is a class in C1 or C2
isInternal(t)
(isExternal)
Type t is an interface in C1 or C2
isExternal(t)
(isPrimitive)
Type t is Unit, Bool or Int
isPrimitive(t)
(emulate-paper)
linkof(C) = t
emulate(α, C) = emulate(α, t)
(linkof-base)
(|C|) = (mc, md, t)
linkof(C) = t
(linkof-ind)
∀i ∈ 1..n. linkof(Ci) = ti
linkof(C1, · · · , Cn) = t1 ⊎ · · · ⊎ tn
Since whole AIL programs are never executed with free symbols in their
memory, Rule intfor -symbol is never used.
It is not a problem to accept inputs where the return address is not exe-
cutable; in those cases there will be an automatic
√
. The emulation rules need
to keep track of that, as they do with Rule Emulate - call - fail.
Emulation of actions to JSysKJEMAIL .
(Emulate - call - fwcall -w1)
a ≡ (1, 2 ∗ Nw) w0 == id
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, idid,m, t, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - call - fwcall -w2)
a ≡ (1, 2 ∗ Nw) w3 == 1
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - call - fwret - w1)
a ≡ (1, 3 ∗ Nw) id 6= w0
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - call - fwret - w2)
a ≡ (1, 3 ∗ Nw)
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, ∅,m, t, i, t) = fail
(Emulate - call - testobj)
a ≡ (1, 0) t′ = Bool
E = if (oc.isStep( i ) ) then oc.incrStep(); var retvar = instanceof(Ew,Et)
emulate(w7 : Et, V ) = Ew, V
′ emulate(w8) = Et, ∅
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,mm, t, i, t) = E@m,V ′, w0id, i+ 1,mm, t′t
(Emulate - call - testobj - w)
a ≡ (1, 0) w7 /∈ dom(V )
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = fail
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(Emulate - call - regobj)
a ≡ (1,Nw) t′ = Unit
E = if (oc.isStep( i ) ) then oc.incrStep(); var retvar = unit;
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,mm, t, i, t) = E@m, ∅, w0id, i+ 1,mm, t′t
(Emulate - call - regobj - w)
a ≡ (1,Nw) w7 ∈ dom(V )
emulate(call a w0, · · · , wn?,M0, V, id,m, t, i, t) = fail
C.5 diff(α1, α2, i,M, V,m, t)
All cases have their dual, where the actions are flipped. The arguments are: the
different action for C1, the different action for C2, the index preceding those
actions, the knowledge of method bindings, the knowledge of object bindings,
the stack of current methods and the stack of expected return types. In the
following, indicate an empty action with ∅.
(Diff-length-tick)
diff(
√
, ∅, i,M, V,mm, t) = ∅@m@i, ∅@m@i
(Diff-length-call)
E = exit( 1 ); m :Mt = emulate(a,M)
diff(call a w!, ∅, i,M, V,m, t) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-length-return)
E = exit( 1 );
diff(ret a w,w′!, ∅, i,M, V,mm, t) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-rets-primitive)
isPrimitive(t) emulate(w : t, V ) = Er, V ′
E = if ( retvar == Er ) { exit( 1 ); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(ret a w,w′!, ret a w1, w
′
1!, i,M, V,mm, tt) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-rets-addr)
the code of (| · |) only uses what was passed in r0 and r5 as addresses to return
so this case never arises because the addresses where to return
are always the same (they come from the same ?-decorated actions)
diff(ret a′ w,w′!, ret a w, w′!, i,M, V,mm, tt) = ∅
(Diff-rets-internal)
isInternal(t) emulate(w : t, V ) = Er, V ′
E = if ( retvar == Er ) { exit( 1 ); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(ret a w,w′!, ret a w1, w
′
1!, i,M, V,mm, tt) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-rets-external)
isExternal(t) emulate(w : t, V ) = Er, V ′
E = if ( retvar == Er ) { exit(1); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(ret a w,w′!, ret a w1, w
′
1!, i,M, V,mm, tt) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-calls-methods)
E1 = exit(1); emulate(a,M) = m1 : Mt1
E2 = oc.diverge(); emulate(a
′,M) = m2 :Mt2
diff(call a w!, call a′ w!, i,M, V,m, t) = E1@m1@i, E2@m2@i
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(Diff-callee)
w = w1, · · · , wn w′ = w′1, · · · , w′n w5 6= w′5
emulate(a,M) = m : t(t1, · · · , tn)→ t′ emulate(w5 : t, V ) = Er, V ′
E = if ( this == Er ) { exit( 1 ); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(call a w!, call a w′!, i,M, V,m, t) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-calls2-parameters - primitive)
w = w1, · · · , wn w′ = w′1, · · · , w′n ∃i ∈ 6..n.wi 6= w′i
emulate(a,M) = m : t(t1, · · · , tn)→ t′ isPrimitive(ti) emulate(wi : ti, V ) = Er, V ′
E = if ( retvar == Er ) { exit( 1 ); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(call a w!, call a w′!, i) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-calls2-parameters - internal)
w = w1, · · · , wn w′ = w′1, · · · , w′n ∃i ∈ 6..n.wi 6= w′i
emulate(a,M) = m : t(t1, · · · , tn)→ t′ isInternal(ti) emulate(wi : ti, V ) = Er, V ′
Let the name of the i-th parameter be xi
E = if ( xi == E
r ) { exit(1); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(call a w!, call a w′!, i) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-calls2-parameters - external)
w = w1, · · · , wn w′ = w′1, · · · , w′n ∃i ∈ 6..n.wi 6= w′i
emulate(a,M) = m : t(t1, · · · , tn)→ t′ isExternal(ti)
Let the name of the i-th parameter be xi emulate(wi : ti, V ) = E
r, V ′
E = if ( xi == E
r ) { exit(1); } else { oc.diverge(); }
diff(call a w!, call a w′!, i) = E@m@i, E@m@i
(Diff-r0–r4)
w = w1, · · · , wn w′ = w′1, · · · , w′n ∃i ∈ 0, 1, 2, 4.wi 6= w′i
r0 to r2 are always reset to 0 so this case does not exist
r4 contains the returnback entry point address, which is always 0
diff(call a w!, call a w′!, i,M, V,m, t) = ∅
(Diff-acts)
E1 = exit( 1 ); emulate(a,M) = m1 : Mt E2 = oc.diverge();
diff(call a w!, ret a′ w,w′!, i,M, V,m2m, t) = E1@m1@i, E2@m2@i
(Diff-acts2)
emulate(a,M) = m1 :Mt E1 = oc.diverge();
diff(call a w!,
√
, i,M, V,m, t) = E1@m1@i, E1@m1@i
(Diff-acts3)
E1 = oc.diverge();
diff(ret a′ w,w′!,
√
, i,M, V,m1m, t) = E1@m1@i, E1@m1@i
Since the code is placed inside the code generated by the last action i, the code
generated by diff( · ) does not need to be wrapped in an if ( oc.isStep( i )).
D Proofs of Section 6
This section contains only proofs and proof sketches that are not found in the
paper.
Well-behaved Contextual Equivalence A form of contextual equivalence con-
sidering a restricted number of contexts is well-behaved contextual equivalence,
denoted as M1
w-b≃ctxAILJEMM2 [33]. Well-behaved contextual equivalence is defined
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for AIL modules with respect to JEM contexts. Well-behaved contextual equiva-
lence is analogous to contextual equivalence except that it considers a subset of
AIL contexts, namely those that behave like JEM ones.
The notion of well-behaved contextual equivalence is used for compiler cor-
rectness specification, Assumption 4 can be restated as Assumption 6.
Assumption 6 ((| · |) is correct). ∀C1, C2.C1≃ctx C2 ⇐⇒ (|C1|) w-b≃ctxAILJEM (|C2|).
Proof sketch of Theorem 1
Proof Sketch. The protect( · ) phase of J ·KJEMAIL does not modify how expressions
are compiled (i.e., the workings of (| · |)) except for how instanceof is compiled
and how external functions are invoked.
Additionally, the methodEP code is prepended to all method calls and the
returnEP code is prepended to all returns.
These procedures contain checks that can abort, though correct code never
trigger them.
As presented in Problem 5, instanceof is compiled to testObj( · ).
We can see that this is correct by simply inspecting its code.
The other modification done to (| · |) code is in the way external functions
are called.
The chaining of preamble( · ) ensures that securely-compiled modules are
exited via JSysK
JEM
AIL .
The forwardCall( · ) function respects the registers calling convention of
Assumption 2.
Moreover, it only insists that returnbacks are done to the forwardReturn( · )
entry point.
For well-behaving contexts, that entry point just acts as a proxy for the real
return entry point, so no semantics change is introduced there.
Moreover, forwardReturn( · ) also respects Assumption 2.
Well-behaving contexts will not call any entry point in JSysKJEMAIL except for
testObject( · ) and registerObject( · ).
The former is a correct implementation of instanceof, as already discussed.
The second one will never abort for well-behaving contexts since only new
objects will be registered.
Therefore, the additional functionalities of JSysKJEMAIL do not alter the seman-
tics of correct programs.
Because of this, J · KJEMAIL satisfies Assumption 6.
So we have: ∀C1, C2.C1≃ctx C2 ⇐⇒ JC1KJEMAIL w-b≃ctxAILJEM JC2KJEMAIL .
JEM-like-behaving contexts in AIL are a subset of all the AIL contexts, we have
JC1KJEMAIL ≃ctx JC2KJEMAIL ⇒ JC1KJEMAIL w-b≃ctxAILJEM JC2KJEMAIL .
Because we changed the calling convention, we need to show that all of these
well-behaved contexts, which used the (| · |) calling convention, can be made to
adopt the J · KJEMAIL one.
This can be done by adding the following instructions before a jump to a
module – intuitively at the single exit point of those contexts:
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• assume the address where to jump is stored in rn, ri where n and i are
any register with index from 0 to 4 (it can’t be other indices as they are
needed by the (| · |) calling convention)
• store rn into r4 and ri into r3
• load 1 into ri and 2*Nw into rn
• jmp rn ri
We can therefore chain the implications above to conclude the thesis. ✷
Lemma 2 (Method emulation is correct). emulate(a,M) = m : Mt ⇐⇒
(|m|) = a.
Proof Sketch. This can be seen by Rules Emulate - addresses and Emulate - addresses - fail
and the constitution of M0 in Rule methodKnowledge. ✷
Lemma 3 (Value emulation is correct). emulate(w : t, V ) = E, V ′ ⇐⇒ (|E|) =
w.
Proof Sketch. This can be seen by Rules Emulate - values - unit to Emulate - values - external old
and Emulate - values - external new to Emulate - values - intern - fail and by
the constitution of V0 in Rule objectsKnowledge and by the update on V in all
emulate( · ) rules in Appendix C.4. ✷
Proof of Lemma 1.
As a helper, here is a table of all additionally-defined functions and whether
they can abort (i.e., call halt) or not.
testObj yes
registerObj yes
forwardCall yes, twice
forwardReturn yes, twice
classOf no
isinternal no
updatemaskingtable no (but it calls registerObj)
loadobject no (but it calls lookup in T )
lookup in T yes
maskingTable no
dynamictypechecks yes, twice plus it calls testObj
maskObjectid no
signatureof no
loadData no
storedata no
extraCode no
extraData no
append no
replace no
method ep yes
return ep yes
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Proof Sketch. This proof is split in 2 cases, one for each direction of the co-
implication.
By Assumption 3 we know that
√
is only produced by triggered checks.
∀C, (|C|) = (mc,md, t).α√ ∈ TracesAIL(JCKJEMAIL )⇒ emulate(α, t) = fail . By inspect-
ing the pseudocode of entry points created by protect( · ), we can see what
function aborted, causing a
√
in the trace:
method entry point :
0m it can abort if the jump does not come from JSysK
JEM
AIL with return
address being the forwrd return entry point
1m dynamicTypechecks() can abort on ill-typed or unregistered pa-
rameters;
2m loadObjects() can abort on fake or non-existing parameters (ac-
tually, it’s lookup in T that aborts);
forwardReturn entry point :
1r it can abort if a return is made when no outcall was done (empty
S);
2r it can abort if the return is not made by the module that was
called (mismatching r0);
return entry point :
3r dynamicTypechecks() can abort on an ill-typed return value;
4r it can abort if the module jumping here is not JSysK
JEM
AIL .
violation of the PMA access control policy :
5r a return to a previously-communicated address that is not exe-
cutable
We can then analyse the action preceding the
√
.
The proof proceeds by induction on the size of α.
α = ∅ Trivial.
α = α1, · · · , αn where n%2 = 1 so αn = γn?. The proof proceeds by case
analysis on γn?.
call a w0, · · · , wm? :
Let us consider first the case when a is a method entry point,
considering the case of a successful forward by JSysK
JEM
AIL .
w0 is the caller id placed by PMA, if it is not JSysK
JEM
AIL , the exe-
cution aborts as in point 0m above, so Rule Emulate - call -fail2
fail s.
w1-w5 are unused registers.
w6 is the current object, if that is not an encoding of an object
that implements class t (Point 2m above), Rule Emulate - values - intern - fail
fail s.
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wi with i ∈ 7..l, if that is not a valid encoding of a value of type ti
(Points 1m and 2m above), then Rules Emulate - values - unit fail,
Emulate - values- bool fail, Emulate - values - external old - fail,
Emulate - values - intern - fail and Emulate - obj -ex fail fail . These
rules cover all possible cases of ill-typed parameters for Unit
(Rule Emulate - values - unit fail), Bool (Rule Emulate - values- bool fail),
Obj (Rule Emulate - obj -ex fail), or class type (Rules Emulate - values - external old - fail
and Emulate - values - intern - fail).
wj with l < j < m, those registers are not used.
Let us consider when a is an entry point of JSysK
JEM
AIL ; considera-
tions for words that are not parameters (so w1 to w6 and 9 and
beyond) are analogous to those above
• a is testObj()
w7 can be a non-existing object id, in which case Rule Emulate - call - testobj - w
fail s.
There are no checks that the class encoding passed via w8 is
correct. When called from secure components, this (and the
next) function are always called with correct class encodings.
If the external code puts something else inside, it may try to
cheat, but we’ll find out because we test with correct class
encodings. Otherwise, it could put anything inside, an object
of a type that we don’t know and don’t use. In this case
JSysK
JEM
AIL would not be able to know this class. So we cannot
filter based on known class encodings.
• a is registerObj()
w7 can be an existing object id, in which case Rule Emulate - call - regobj - w
fail s.
• a is forwardCall()
w0 can be the id of the module that last made a call (so no
return was made), so Rule Emulate - call - fwcall -w1 fail s.
w3 can be the JSysK
JEM
AIL module id, so someone is trying to
forward a call to JSysK
JEM
AIL via JSysK
JEM
AIL , so Rule Emulate - call - fwcall -w2
fail s.
w5 is the address to return to, if that (plus the id w0) is not an
executable address (Point 5r above), Rule Emulate - call - fail
fail s.
• a is forwardReturn()
If the stack S is empty, someone is returning without any
call being made, so Rule Emulate - call - fwret - w2 fail s.
If w0 is not the module id of the last module that made a
call, Rule Emulate - call - fwret - w1 fail s.
ret a w,w′? :
If a is not the address of forwardReturn(), Rule Emulate - returnback - fail2
fail s.
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So a let’s consider a to be the address of forwardReturn().
If the action’s index h = 1, then no returns can be made (Point
1r above) and Rule Emulate - call - fwret - w2 fail s.
Let the last called method have return type t and come from
module with id id.
If w is not a valid encoding of a value of type t, see previous case
(Point 3r above).
If w′ is not id, Rule Emulate - returnback - fail fail s (Point 2r
above).
Having covered all cases when a
√
can be generated in traces, this
case holds.
∀C, (|C|) = (mc,md, t).α√ ∈ TracesAIL(JCKJEMAIL )⇐ emulate(α, t) = fail . The proof
proceeds by analysing all cases that generate a fail (in Appendix C.4).
Rule Emulate - returnback - fail In this case the check inserted by
checkShortcutting() ensures the
√
is generated.
Rule Emulate - returnback - fail2 In this case the check inserted by
checkLocalStack() ensures the
√
is generated.
Rule Emulate - addresses - fail The PMA architecture ensures the only
addresses one can jump to is a valid entry point.
Rule Emulate - values - unit fail In this case the check inserted by
dynamicTypechecks() ensures the
√
is generated.
Rule Emulate - values- bool fail In this case the check inserted by
dynamicTypechecks() ensures the
√
is generated.
Rule Emulate - values - external old - fail In this case if the object
id is a non-existant id, then loadObjects() will call lookup on T that
will abort, ensuring the
√
is generated Otherwise, if the object id is
ill-typed, dynamicTypechecks() calls testObject(), the check there
ensures the
√
is generated.
Rule Emulate - values - intern - fail In this case if the object id is
a non-existant id, then loadObjects() will call lookup on T that
will abort, ensuring the
√
is generated Otherwise, if the object id is
ill-typed, dynamicTypechecks() calls testObject(), the check there
ensures the
√
is generated.
Rule Emulate - obj -ex fail In this case if the object id is a non-existant
id, then loadObjects() will call lookup on T that will abort, en-
suring the
√
is generated Otherwise, if the object id is ill-typed,
dynamicTypechecks() calls testObject(), the check there ensures
the
√
is generated.
Rule intfor -symbol Because we are only considered memories where
no symbols are present, nor passed, this is never triggered.
Rule Emulate - call - fail In this case, the violation of the PMA access
control policy ensures the
√
is generated.
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Rule Emulate - call - fail In this case, the return jump to (r0,r5) will
be halted by the PMA.
Rule Emulate - call - fwcall -w1 In this case the check by forwardCall()
that the calling id is not the last id is triggered.
Rule Emulate - call - fwcall -w2 In this case the check by forwardCall()
that the forwarding module id is not 1 is triggered.
Rule Emulate - call - fwret - w1 In this case the check by forwardReturn()
that the returning id is not the last caller’s one is triggered
Rule Emulate - call - fwret - w2 In this case the check by forwardReturn()
that the stack is empty is triggered.
Rule Emulate - call - testobj - w In this case the check by testObj()
that the object to be registered is not fresh is triggered.
Rule Emulate - call - regobj - w In this case the check by registerObj()
that the object to be tested exists is triggered.
Having considered all the cases when a fail is generated, this case holds.
✷
Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof Sketch. We need to prove that:
skeleton(C1, C2) is correct and it produces well-typed code.
This can be verified by inspecting the skeleton( · ) definition in Ap-
pendix C.3.
emulate(α, t) is correct, it produces well-typed code that correctly emulates
all actions in α.
This proof proceeds by induction on the length of α. The base case in
void, so only the inductive case is presented.
Assume α = α1, · · · , αk−1, αk. Denote α1, · · · , αk−1 with α′. The induc-
tive hypothesis tells us that emulate(α′, t) is correct, it produces well-
typed code that correctly emulates all actions in α′
We need to prove that the emulation of αk is correct. Formally, this is cap-
tured by: emulate(αk,Mk, Vk + Vk−1, idk,mk, tk, ik) = Ak, V
′
k, idk, ik,mk, tk.
The proof proceeds by case analysis on αk.
call a w1, · · · , vn? Rule Emulate - call ensures that the call is emulated
by a well-typed method call to the correct method. The correctness
of the method is given by Lemma 2 while the correctness of the
arguments and the current object is given by Lemma 3.
call a w1, · · · , vn! Rule Emulate - callback ensures that the state of oc
is updated correctly.
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ret a w,w′? Rule Emulate - returnback ensures that this is emulated by
returning the right value. The correctness of returned value is given
by Lemma 3.
ret a w,w′! Rule Emulate - return ensures that the state of oc is updated
correctly.
√
in this case the code is empty, as produced by Rule Emulate- fail.
This is because the preceding trace must have generated a fail , as
guaranteed by Lemma 1.
diff(α1, α2, i,M, V,m, t) is correct, it produces well-typed code and it consid-
ers all possible cases where α1 and α2 can be different.
This can be verified by inspecting the diff( · ) definition in Appendix C.5.
Possible cases of different actions:
Different action :
call-return Rule Diff-acts
call-tick Rule Diff-acts2
return-tick Rule Diff-acts3
call-nothing Rule Diff-length-call
return-nothing Rule Diff-length-return
tick-nothing Rule Diff-length-tick
Same action, different parameter :
outcall : call a w1, · · · , wn!
different address a Rule Diff-calls-methods
different word w0 This is always 1
different word w1 to w4 Rule Diff-r0–r4
different word w5 This is always 3*Nw
different word w6 Rule Diff-callee
different word wi with i ∈ 7..nRules Diff-calls2-parameters - primitive
to Diff-calls2-parameters - external
return : ret a w,w′!
different address a Rule Diff-rets-addr
different id id This is always 1
different word w Rules Diff-rets-primitive, Diff-rets-internal and Diff-rets-external
C1 and C2 have the same import requirements, otherwise it’s trivial to
differentiate them. Rule Emulate and the definition of skeleton( · ) ensure
that all required interfaces are implemented in C as well as all objects, so
this points holds.
✷
Proof of Theorem 2.
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C⌢C1 and C⌢ C2. Proof. Trace semantics deals with sets of traces, while the algo-
rithm inputs single traces. Moreover, these single traces must be the same up
to a !-decorated action. The two different single traces are obtained as follows.
Since JC1KJEMAIL T=/ JC2KJEMAIL , we have that TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ) 6= TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ).
So there exists a trace α that belongs to either only TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ) or only to
TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ) but not to both. Assume wlog that α ∈ TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ).
The trace α can be split in two parts αs and αd such that α=αsαd and such
that αs is the longest prefix of all traces of α2. Let i be the index of αd in α.
So, there exists a trace α′ ∈ TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ) that can be split in two parts αs
and α′d such that α
′=αsα
′
d and αd 6= α′d. Trace α′ always exists, it could be an
empty trace, it could be composed by an empty αs and, possibly, by an empty
α′d.
Theorem 3 tells us that we can use 〈〈·〉〉 to get the component that differen-
tiates between C1 and C2.
Define C[C1]⇑ ⇐⇒/ C[C2]⇑ as C[C1]⇑ ∧ C[C2]⇓ or C[C2]⇑ ∧ C[C1]⇓.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof. The equivalence is split into two subgoals (directions). Apply Theorem 1
to fulfill direction ⇐. The direction ⇒ is restated using Assumption 5 into:
∀C1, C2, C1≃ctx C2 ⇒ JC1KJEMAIL T= JC2KJEMAIL . The contrapositive of this direction
is: ∀C1, C2, JC1KJEMAIL T=/ JC2KJEMAIL ⇒ C1 6≃ctx C2. Apply Theorem 2 to prove this
direction.
Corollary 2 (Modular full-abstraction for compiled components). ∀C1, C2, C3, C4.
C1; C2≃ctx C3; C4 ⇐⇒ link(JC1KJEMAIL , JC2KJEMAIL )≃ctx link(JC3KJEMAIL , JC4KJEMAIL ).
Proof. Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 4 and modularity of J · KJEMAIL .
Let C1 = C11 , · · · , Cn1 , C2 = C12 , · · · , Cm2 , C3 = C13 , · · · , Cl3, C4 = C14 , · · · , Ck4 .
By Definition 1 we have that n+m = l + k.
Let C = C11 , · · · , Cn1 , C12 , · · · , Cm2 and C′ = C13 , · · · , Cl3, C14 , · · · , Ck4 .
Theorem 4 yields that, C ≃ctx C′ ⇐⇒ JCKJEMAIL ≃ctx JC′KJEMAIL .
By definition of J·KJEMAIL , we have link(JC11 KJEMAIL , · · · , JCn1 KJEMAIL , JC12KJEMAIL , · · · , JCm2 KJEMAIL )≃ctx
link(JC13K
JEM
AIL , · · · , JCl3KJEMAIL , JC14 KJEMAIL , · · · , JCk4 KJEMAIL ), so the thesis holds.
Theorem 5 (Contextual equivalence is congruent with linking). ∀P1, P2, P3.
P2≃ctx P3, link(P1, P2)≃ctx link(P1, P3).
Proof Sketch. P2≃ctx P3 tells us that P2 and P3 have the same modules.
If there is any overlapping module (except JSysK
JEM
AIL ) between P1 and P2 or
P3, the result will be an empty memory.
If there is no overlap, then linking simply merges the modules, which trivially
preserves ≃ctx . ✷
Proof of Corollary 1.
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Proof. By Corollary 2, we have that link(JC1KJEMAIL , JC2KJEMAIL )≃ctx link(JC3KJEMAIL , JC4KJEMAIL ).
By Theorem 5 we have that link(JC1KJEMAIL , JC2KJEMAIL )≃ctx link(JC1KJEMAIL , P ).
By Theorem 5 we have that link(JC3KJEMAIL , JC4KJEMAIL )≃ctx link(JC3KJEMAIL , P ′).
By transitivity of contextual equivalence, the thesis holds.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. JC1KJEMAIL T=/ JC2KJEMAIL means that TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ) 6= TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ),
so there exists a trace αα1 ∈ TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ) but αα1 /∈ TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ).
Let α be the longest odd-length prefix of traces from TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ) and
TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL ) such that αα1 ∈ TracesAIL(JC1KJEMAIL ) and αα2 ∈ TracesAIL(JC2KJEMAIL )
and α1 6= α2. The index of α1 and α2 is even, so they are generated by JC1KJEMAIL
and JC2KJEMAIL respectively. Theorem 3 tells us that 〈〈C1, C2, αα1, αα2〉〉 yields the
context that differentiates between C1 and C2.
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